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THE LOADSTONE ROCK: THE ROLE OF HARM IN THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF PLURAL UNIONS
Jonathan Turley∗
ABSTRACT
In this Article, Professor Turley explores the concept of social harm in the
context of two recent cases in the United States and Canada over the
criminalization of polygamy. The cases not only resulted in sharply divergent
conclusions in striking down and upholding such laws respectively, but they
offered strikingly different views of the concept of harm in the regulation of
private consensual relations. Professor Turley draws comparisons with the
debate over morality laws between figures like Lord Patrick Devlin and H.L.A.
Hart in the last century. Professor Turley argues that the legal moralism of
figures like Devlin have returned in a different form as a type of “compulsive
liberalism” that seeks limitations on speech and consensual conduct to combat
sexism and other social ills. The alternative, advocated in this Article, is the
adoption of a Millian approach to harm that requires a more concrete form of
injury or harm to justify individual choice. In what he calls the “Loadstone
Rock” of constitutional analysis, the definition of harm continues to dictate the
outcome of the conflict between individual choice and social mores.

∗ J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Chair of Public Interest Law, George Washington University. I wish to
thank The George Washington Law School for a generous grant for the research and writing of this Article. I
also wish to thank the staff of the Emory Law Journal for their inspired editing and research on this Article.
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It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it
was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the
season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of
despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we
were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other
way . . . .1

INTRODUCTION
The recent federal decision2 to strike down the criminalization of
polygamous relationships in Utah was met with a mix of rejoicing and rage.
What was an emancipating decision for thousands of plural families was
denounced as the final descent into a moral abyss by others.3 Indeed, former
Senator Rick Santorum4 and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia5 had previously
warned that the decriminalization of homosexual relations would lead to a
parade of horribles, including the decriminalization of polygamy. The
relatively straightforward claims in Brown v. Buhman were overshadowed by
such predictions of social and legal disintegration should we succeed.6
Underlying these statements is a more fundamental question about the basis for

1

CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 1 (Andrew Sanders ed., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2008)

(1859).
2

The actual decision striking down the cohabitation language of the statute came in 2013, see Brown v.
Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013), but the final ruling (on the Section 1983 claim) was issued, in
favor of the challengers, in 2014. Brown v. Herbert, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1229 (D. Utah 2014).
3 Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., In the “Sister Wives” Case, Morality Wins, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2013, at
B5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thanks-to-the-sister-wives-lawsuit-we-have-oneless-morality-law-thats-a-good-thing/2013/12/20/3c419ba0-676d-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html.
4 Santorum responded to the ruling in Brown with the following tweet: “Some times I hate it when what
I predict comes true”—referring to his 2003 claim that legalizing “consensual sex within your home” would
lead to the legalization of polygamy and “undermine the fabric of our society.” Excerpt from Santorum
Interview, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 23, 2003, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/
2003-04-23-santorum-excerpt_x.htm; Rick Santorum, TWITTER (Dec. 15, 2013, 5:49 AM),
https://twitter.com/ricksantorum/status/412217738246258688 (last visited May 17, 2015).
5 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that the
decriminalization of homosexuality through the overturning of Bowers v. Hardwick would “effectively
decree[] the end of all morals legislation,” including fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and
obscenity).
6 The only positive aspects to these articles often appeared to be predictions that we could not prevail in
the case. “Sister Wives” Stars Sue Utah, Say Polygamy Ban Is Unconstitutional, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25,
2012, available at http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2012/07/25/ister-wives-stars-sue-utah-saypolygamy-ban-is-unconstitutional/ (quoting a Stanford University Professor as predicting failure and noting
that “[c]ontemporary law under the First Amendment regarding the exercise of religion is just not very friendly
to the claims of polygamists”).
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morality legislation in the United States.7 This question is made all the more
interesting by the inapposite result reached by the Canadian Supreme Court in
Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada just a couple years
earlier in a case out of Bountiful, British Columbia (hereinafter the Bountiful
case or Bountiful).8 That case involved a cohabitation law that was upheld
based on the presumption of harm, inherent in plural families, to women and
children as well as to the institution of marriage generally. As lead counsel in
Brown v. Buhman and one of the experts heard in the Bountiful case, the
difference was striking. In one case, privacy prevailed; in the other, it was
morality that shaped the outcome. It is a tale of two cases that rivals Dickens,
and, for privacy advocates, these cases were truly the best and the worst of
times.9
The Brown and Bountiful cases not only focus attention on the widely
practiced tradition of polygamy around the world but also the notion of harm
underlying criminal provisions. The sharply divergent approach to harm was
the most salient difference in the analysis under the two cases. Canada has long
followed a modus vivendi approach to liberalism that embraces diversity of
opinions and values in a pluralistic society.10 However, that approach was
shown to be limited in the context of plural relationships in the Bountiful case.
Across the border, the United States District Court in Salt Lake City reached
the diametrically opposite result with a strikingly similar statute to the one in
British Columbia. Much of the difference is due to the question of harm and
how it is addressed within the context of morality laws.
This Article will not address the question of whether there is a general right
for consensual adults to live in a plural relationship. Cohabitation is a core
privacy right that is normally protected between consenting adults.11 Few
people continue to argue that society has a right to regulate consensual sexual
relations between adults, and it is quite common for people to have multiple

7 See Turley, supra note 3; Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., One Big, Happy Polygamous Family, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2011, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/opinion/21turley.html.
8 I served as the legal expert supporting the challenge to the Canadian law. See Reference re: Section
293 of the Criminal Code of Can., 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 256 (Can.) [hereinafter Bountiful].
9 This same conflict over the use of social harm as the basis for discriminatory laws is at the heart of the
consolidated cases under review with the United States Supreme Court over same-sex marriage. See DeBoer v.
Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015) (granting review of the Sixth
Circuit decisions upholding Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee marriage limitations).
10 See Alex Fielding, When Rights Collide: Liberalism, Pluralism and Freedom of Religion in Canada,
13 APPEAL 28 (2008).
11 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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sexual partners today.12 Indeed, from 1960 to 2006, the number of nonmarital
cohabitants grew by more than 1,000%.13 Moreover, this Article will not
explore whether polygamy is clearly a bona fide religious practice. Polygamy
is an ancient religious-based practice that continues to be followed by millions
around the world. Many polygamists follow the practice out of secular or
personal reasons distinct from religious traditions.14 Given the historical,
religious, and social foundation for plural relationships, courts like the one in
the Bountiful decision have upheld criminalization based largely on the
assumption of harm. These courts often assert that polygamy is inherently
harmful on the basis of little more than anecdotal evidence or value-driven
opinions. Indeed, the courts rarely consider the full array of polygamous
relationships and focus not just on polygyny but the most extreme forms of
polygyny.
The question of harm has long been at the heart of philosophical theories
that attempt to define when a state may legitimately curtail or criminalize the
conduct of its citizens. The most famous of such theories is the “Harm
Principle” by John Stuart Mill, who believed that “the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”15 Mill’s harm principle is a
foundation for many modern rights from privacy to association to speech. It is
a particularly penetrating standard because it forces society to move beyond
generalized notions of immorality or social harm to isolate specific harms
caused by proscribed conduct. It posits that the burden rests with the
12 Courts have recognized the new reality of large numbers of adults living together outside of marriage.
For example, over four decades ago, the Supreme Court of California decided Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106
(Cal. 1976), which recognized the ability of such couples to have binding contracts. Indeed, studies show a
very high percentage of “one-night stands” or single sexual encounters with lovers. Over forty-six percent of
the sexual relations by responding individuals in one study proved to be one-time encounters with individuals.
See EDWARD O. LAUMANN, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 172–225 (1994). Another study showed that 1,627 respondents reported 4,324 different sexual partners
before they were nineteen years old and, of those 4,324, 1,506 (or 35.6%) were with one-time only partners.
Articles, Books and Other Writing, Ian Ayres, http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayers/indexchron.htm (last visited
May 17, 2015) (scroll to “A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex” and select hyperlinks associated with relevant
datasets). This study was cited and discussed in Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of
Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 599 (2005); and in Christopher Shea, Criminalizing Reckless Sex, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 62, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/12/magazine/
12CRIMINALIZING.html.
13 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2007: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA 19–20 & fig.7 (2007), http://stateofourunions.org/pdfs/SOOU2007.pdf.
14 Jane Tucker, Note, Taming The Green-Eyed Monster: On the Need To Rethink Our Cultural
Conception of Jealousy, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 223, 239 (2013).
15 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 23 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1863) (1859).
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government not just to balance rights against harm but also to establish the
specific harm posed by the proscribed conduct. The scope of that harm for Mill
is necessarily confined to actual as opposed to spiritual or moral harm.
Otherwise, any law could be justified on a claim that the law codifies or
protects morality. There is unquestionably a moral or normative element to
many crimes like murder or rape. However, these crimes involve physical
harm committed without consent.16 This Article focuses on consensual acts and
relations of adults. These polygamists do not view themselves as harmed, but
their relationships are being deemed harmful because they run against
majoritarian values and sentiments.
In case after case, courts return to the question of harm: harm in interracial
marriage,17 harm in same sex marriage,18 harm in plural marriage. While the
first two claims were ultimately rejected, harm remains the magnetic focal
point for modern analysis. It functions much like what Dickens called “The
Loadstone Rock” in A Tale of Two Cities—the rock upon which inevitably all
cases must break.19 It draws all analysis to the question of what is the harm of a
consensual union that would justify criminal sanctions. While the
criminalization of different forms of marriage—whether interracial, plural, or
homosexual—was once based on open majoritarian moral judgments, modern
cases and scholarship have tended to emphasize social harm. Modern
jurisprudence—and sensibility—eschews direct moral dictates. This can create
a thin veneer for what are really moral dictates. Normative or moral claims
underlying criminal sanctions are sometimes justified on loose claims of social
harm, such as the effect of certain acts in degrading or marginalizing particular
groups. This nexus between social harm and criminal sanctions is placed into
sharp relief when courts seek to satisfy tests for the constitutionality of the
underlying laws. In the United States, the harm analysis is unavoidable,

16

Obviously, in cases of statutory rape, there is the legal absence of consent due to the age of the victim.
See, e.g., Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 25–27 (Cal. 1948) (discussing but ultimately rejecting
respondent’s claims that state statutes barring interracial marriage “diminish[] race tension and prevent[] the
birth of children who might become social problems”).
18 See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65, 469 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting defendants’ argument
that “same-sex marriage will harm existing and especially future opposite-sex couples and their children
because the message communicated by the social institution of marriage will be lost”); Baskin v. Bogan, 766
F.3d 648, 668 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is sufficiently implausible that allowing same-sex marriage would cause
palpable harm to family, society, or civilization . . . .”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert,
755 F.3d 1193, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We cannot embrace the contention that children raised by opposite-sex
parents fare better than children raised by same-sex parents . . . .”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
19 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 233 (“The Loadstone Rock was drawing him, and he must sail on, until he
struck. He knew of no rock; he saw hardly any danger.”).
17
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regardless of the test applied, from strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny to
rational basis standards. While the burden differs significantly, they all
inevitably arrive at the Loadstone Rock of harm. Even the mere demand of a
rational basis requires some nexus to a concrete harm—a linkage that was
found missing in Brown. Moreover, a Millian view of harm suggests a broader
use of “rational basis with bite,” which is often cited in animus jurisprudence
in areas like equal protection.20 If “the hallmark of animus jurisprudence is its
focus on actual legislative motive,”21 the hallmark of harm analysis must be
concrete injury to individuals or society at large.
In Part I, this Article explores the decisions in Canada and the United
States on the criminalization of plural relationships—addressing harm in
fundamentally different ways. Part II then explores the notion of harm as the
basis for criminal laws. The discussion begins with the utilitarian work of
Jeremy Bentham and the later work of John Stuart Mill. Mill’s harm principle
illustrates how the Supreme Court took the wrong path in Reynolds v. United
States in 1879 in its embrace of a broad notion of social harm to uphold the
criminalization of polygamy.22 Mill’s work offers not only an objective basis
for decriminalization of many of these areas but is better suited for the
emerging privacy-based doctrines taking hold in the United States, Canada,
and other nations. The division of opinions between the courts in Canada and
the United States bares close resemblance to the famous Hart–Devlin debate
over morality legislation. Under a Millian approach, harm to morality alone
would not be a cognizable basis for state or federal laws. The discussion will
then turn to the reemergence of a debate over the scope of government
regulation of consensual choices. While figures like Lord Patrick Devlin once
argued for such regulation to defend Christian morality, this Article will look
at contemporary scholars who advance what this Article calls a “compulsive
liberalism,” where harm is defined broadly to subsume consensual acts that
foster discrimination or stereotypes. While the views of Mill and Hart were
once a foundational principle for liberals, this new scholarship seems to
channel many of Devlin’s assumptions about the right of society to force
individuals to live according to majoritarian values. This includes arguments
for limiting speech and other core freedoms. Part III then explores and
critiques these divergent views on harm as they have been manifested in the
20 Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1099 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kenji Yoshino,
The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011).
21 Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1099.
22 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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litigation over plural unions. The Article looks closely at the testimony of two
scholars who testified in favor of criminalization in the Bountiful case:
Professors Marci Hamilton and Rebecca Cook. For these scholars, harm is a
vehicle for the protection of particular public values. Part III then explores
harm as a limiting principle on governmental coercion in a Millian approach.
The requirement of a causal relation to demonstrated harm is consistent with
the Court’s ruling in Lawrence v. Texas.23 However, there remains some
resilience in the use of public morality or values as a basis for criminal
sanctions. We inevitably return to the concept of harm as the Loadstone Rock
in determining how individual freedom and social values break in conflicts like
plural unions. Ultimately, the Article argues for a Millian approach to harm
that would not only resolve these cases in favor of individual choice but
reinforce standards like the rational basis test in requiring tangible and direct
social harm. These two cases present a perfect microcosm of this broader
debate. Regardless of how you view the essence of these cases, what is clear is
that all analytical roads lead to the Loadstone Rock of harm.
I. A TALE OF TWO CASES: THE BOUNTIFUL AND BROWN LITIGATION
The intriguing comparison between the Bountiful and Brown cases is due in
large part to the similarity of the two underlying laws criminalizing
cohabitation or plural relationships. Both Canada and the United States
recognize privacy protections for consensual sexual relations between adults.
However, both nations criminalized cohabitation, which swept across
polygamy categories from polyamory to polyandry to polygyny. The broad
language and general applicability of the laws magnified the importance of
defining harm as part of the constitutional analysis. Despite the similarities in
scope and language, it was the different approach to harm that produced
divergent results.
Section 293 of the Criminal Code was enacted in 1890 in Canada and states
as follows:
Every one who
(a) practises or enters into or in any manner agrees or consents to
practise or enter into
(i) any form of polygamy;

23

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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(ii) any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at
the same time, whether or not it is by law recognized as a
binding form of marriage,

...
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding five years.24

The Canadian law was passed specifically to target Mormons in the late
1800s.25 The law’s enactment occurred at the height of anti-Mormon
sentiments, which viewed Mormons as a group at odds with the very
foundation of Western Civilization.26
The Utah law was crafted in terms of “cohabitation” but had the same
scope as the Canadian law. In the United States, four years after the Canadian
law was enacted, Congress adopted the Utah Enabling Act of 1894 that
conditioned the admission of the territory as a state on the prohibition of
polygamy.27 Within one year, the territory passed the Irrevocable Ordinance, as
demanded, and the prohibition was included in Utah’s 1895 Constitution.28
Like the Canadian law, these measures were passed at the height of
anti-Mormon sentiments in both countries.29 The modern cohabitation statute
was passed in 1873. Utah law states that “[a] person is guilty of bigamy when,
knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband
or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another
person.”30 One distinguishing factor is that the Canadian law draws the
distinction between bigamy and polygamy—a point of common confusion in
24 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 293(1) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/
stat/rsc-1985-c-c-46/latest/rsc-1985-c-c-46.html.
25 Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 983 (Can.) (“Recall that the law in Canada was prompted in part by
a concern that the bigamy prohibition was not sufficiently broad to capture Mormon plural marriage.”).
26 See generally TERRYL L. GIVENS, THE VIPER ON THE HEARTH: MORMONS, MYTHS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF HERESY 23, 130–37 (1997) (discussing how Mormons became the “handy, ready-made
Other” for nineteenth-century society and politics).
27 Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894) (“First. That perfect toleration of religious
sentiment shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person or property on
account of his or her mode of religious worship: Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.”).
28 Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 928 (Utah 1993).
29 See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002); Elijah L. Milne, Blaine Amendments and Polygamy
Laws: The Constitutionality of Anti-Polygamy Laws Targeting Religion, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257 (2006);
Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against
Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 710–20 (2001).
30 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (West 2004), invalidated in part by Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp.
2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
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the United States. Bigamy generally applies to cases where someone holds
multiple marriage licenses, while polygamy goes more broadly to having a
plural family or to cohabitation.31 Section 290 of the Canadian Criminal Code
confines bigamy to a charge of a married person who then participates in a
marriage ceremony with another person. Otherwise, the two provisions sweep
broadly into cohabitation or “conjugal unions” associated with plural
relationships even when the participants do not secure multiple marriage
licenses.
While it is not necessary to go into an exhaustive treatment of both cases, it
is useful to critique the different approaches—and conclusions—of the courts
on the issue of harm.
A. The Bountiful Litigation
The Bountiful case began with the arrests of James Oler and Winston
Blackmore for polygamy. James Oler was the bishop of the Canadian
Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints (FLDS) and associated with Warren Jeffs,32
who was later convicted in the United States of polygamy-related charges.33 In
2002, Winston Blackmore was excommunicated from the FLDS, which led to
a split among the polygamists in Bountiful.34 Both were arrested. However, in
January 2009, the charges were dropped due to irregularities in the selection of
the prosecutors.35 In 2014, both men were again charged with polygamy for
over two decades. The charges alleged multiple marriages, sexual abuse, and

31 See 11 AM. JUR. 2D Bigamy § 1 (2015); Bigamy 13 (Law Reform Comm’n of Can., Working Paper No.
42, 1985), available at http://www.lareau-law.ca/LRCWP42.pdf (“[P]olygamy consists in the maintaining of
conjugal relations by more than two persons. When the result of such relations is to form a single matrimonial
or family entity with the spouses, this is regarded as polygamous marriage. . . . The maintaining of more than
one monogamous union by the same person corresponds with the popular notion of bigamy. . . . In legal terms,
however, [polygamy and bigamy] have a more specific meaning. In particular bigamy, which is defined in
relation to the legal institution of marriage, is distinguished from polygamy by the requirement of formal
marital ties.”).
32 Lindsay Whitehurst, Jailed Warren Jeffs Retakes FLDS Presidency, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2011,
9:42 am), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51297760-76/jeffs-charges-president-warren.html.
33 Jeffs v. State, No. 03-10-00781-CR, 2012 WL 1660612 (Tex. App. May 10, 2012).
34 Emiley Morgan, Jeffs’ Appeal Goes Before Utah Supreme Court, Deseret News, Nov. 3, 2009, at B5,
available
at
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705341547/Jeffs-appeal-goes-before-Utah-SupremeCourt.html.
35 B.C. Polygamy Evidence Helps Warren Jeffs Conviction, CBCNEWS (Aug. 11, 2011, 9:34 PM PT),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/b-c-polygamy-evidence-helps-warren-jeffs-conviction1.1083446.

TURLEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:10 PM

THE LOADSTONE ROCK

1915

cross-border child trafficking. The polygamy counts accused Blackmore of
having twenty-four marriages and Oler of having four wives.36
After the 2009 charges were dropped, British Columbia’s Attorney General
sought the review of the constitutionality of the Polygamy Provision through a
reference to the British Columbia Supreme Court.37 The reference would
involve American experts, including the author of this Article (on the side of
decriminalization)38 and Professors Marci Hamilton39 and Rebecca Cook (in
favor of continued criminalization).40 From the outset, a number of salient
elements in the case strengthened the arguments for decriminalization. The
parties seeking decriminalization constituted consenting adults who were not
accused of any abuse of spouses or children.41 Moreover, they included
polyandrists (unions with one woman and multiple men) and polyamorists
(involving often secular-based plural unions involving multiple couples),42
rather than exclusively polygynists like Blackmore or Oler.43 Finally, the
Attorney General accepted one threshold fact (which the court then used to
frame its analysis): “the case against polygamy is all about harm. Absent harm,
[the Attorney General] accepted that [Section] 293 would not survive scrutiny
under the Charter.”44
My report to the British Columbia Supreme Court focused heavily on the
question of harm and the lack of evidence—as opposed to opinion—regarding
the presumed inherent injuries associated with plural relationships. While
36 Bountiful: Winston Blackmore, James Oler Polygamy Hearing Begins in Creston, B.C., CBCNEWS
(Oct. 10, 2014, 12:26 AM PT), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/bountiful-winstonblackmore-james-oler-polygamy-hearing-begins-in-creston-b-c-1.2793046.
37 This is a procedure that would be instantly rejected in the United States as a request for an advisory
opinion, but it is permissible under Canadian law. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 53(1) (Can.),
available at https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-s-26/latest/rsc-1985-c-s-26.html.
38 Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1599, paras. 235, 256, 300, 335, 799, 835 (Can.) (discussing Turley testimony).
39 Id. paras. 69, 301–302, 334 (discussing Hamilton testimony).
40 Id. paras. 561, 602–603, 798–799, 804–806, 809, 812–814, 821, 823, 830, 837, 841, 845 (discussing
Cook testimony).
41 Id. paras. 18–25.
42 Id. para. 960 (noting “five affidavits from polyandrous polyamorists in Canada”).
43 While Oler would be represented with other parties in the Bountiful case, Blackmore would not.
Id. para. 23 (“Mr. Blackmore, on his own behalf and on behalf of his congregation, sought party status in the
reference and an order for advance costs to allow him to retain and instruct counsel. Both applications were
dismissed, and he was granted interested person status on the same terms as the others. In the end, Mr.
Blackmore opted not to take part in the reference.” (citation omitted)).
44 Id. para. 2. This threshold decision was used by Bauman, however, to reject the framing premise of the
challengers: “that this case is about a wholly unacceptable intrusion by the State into the most basic of rights
guaranteed by the Charter - the freedom to practice one’s religion, and to associate in family units with those
whom one chooses.” Id. para. 3.
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Chief Justice Robert J. Bauman cited that testimony, he did not actually
address the criticism of the absence of direct evidence of harm. Instead,
Bauman ruled against decriminalization based on a sweeping presumption of
inherent harm “to women, to children, to society and to the institution of
monogamous marriage.”45 Specifically, the court found that the following
forms of harm supported the criminalization of plural relationships (the court’s
language with respect to each of these harms is reflected in the text below):
•

Women: Women in polygamous relationships are at an elevated risk of
physical and psychological harm. They face higher rates of domestic
violence and abuse, including sexual abuse. Competition for material
and emotional access to a shared husband can lead to fractious co-wife
relationships. These factors contribute to the higher rates of depressive
disorders and other mental health issues that women in polygamous
relationships face. They have more children, are more likely to die in
childbirth and live shorter lives than their monogamous counterparts.
They tend to have less autonomy, and report higher rates of marital
dissatisfaction and lower levels of self-esteem. They also fare worse
economically, as resources may be inequitably divided or simply
insufficient.46

•

Children: Children in polygamous families face higher infant mortality,
even controlling for economic status and other relevant variables. They
tend to suffer more emotional, behavioural and physical problems, as
well as lower educational achievement than children in monogamous
families. These outcomes are likely the result of higher levels of
conflict, emotional stress and tension in polygamous families. In
particular, rivalry and jealousy among co-wives can cause significant
emotional problems for their children. The inability of fathers to give
sufficient affection and disciplinary attention to all of their children can
further reduce children’s emotional security. Children are also at
enhanced risk of psychological and physical abuse and neglect. Early
marriage for girls is common, frequently to significantly older men. The
resultant early sexual activity, pregnancies and childbirth have negative
health implications for girls, and also significantly limit their
socio-economic development. Shortened inter-birth intervals pose a
heightened risk of various problems for both mother and child.47

•

Society: Polygamy has negative impacts on society flowing from the
high fertility rates, large family size and poverty associated with the
practice. It generates a class of largely poor, unmarried men who are
45
46
47

Id. para. 5.
Id. para. 8.
Id. paras. 9–10.
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statistically predisposed to violence and other anti-social behaviour.
Polygamy also institutionalizes gender inequality. Patriarchal hierarchy
and authoritarian control are common features of polygamous
communities. Individuals in polygynous societies tend to have fewer
civil liberties than their counterparts in societies which prohibit the
practice. Polygamy’s harm to society includes the critical fact that a
great many of its individual harms are not specific to any particular
religious, cultural or regional context. They can be generalized and
expected to occur wherever polygamy exists.48

The court described these families as inherently harmful despite noting that the
conventional structure or definition of a family is changing dramatically in
Canada. The court notably relied on the research of Dr. Zheng Wu, Chair of
the Department of Sociology at the University of Victoria and Director of the
University’s Population Research Group. Wu laid out the data on the
composition of Canadian families.49 That data showed a steadily changing
structure of such families away from the traditional model of a two-parent
family. In 2006, 84.1% of Canadian families were “couple families”—down
from roughly 89% in 1981.50 The largest change in this category was
“common-law couples,” which Wu defined as unmarried cohabitation, and he
placed conjugal unions in the same category.51 This group had grown from
roughly 6% of “couple families” in 1981 to over 18% in 2006.52 These and
other changes were part of what Wu described as the “gradual decline of
marriage” and “the diversification of conjugal life” in Canada.53 Wu detailed
how common law marriages currently represent well over ten percent of
families in every Canadian region, including 23.6% in Yukon, 27.5% in the
Northwest Territories, 28.8% in Quebec, and 31.3% in Nunavut.54 In total,
some 15.5% of all Canadian families are composed of common law families.55
The diversification of Canadian families, however, did not prompt the court to
seriously question whether the Canadian law, and the supporting arguments for
criminalization, were based on a facially narrow model of monogamous
marriage.

48

Id. paras. 13–14.
Id. para. 471.
50 Id.
51 Id. para. 472.
52 Id. para. 471.
53 Id. para. 473 (“Dr. Wu refers to the gradual decline of marriage as a ‘barometer’ of the diversification
of conjugal life.”).
54 Id. para. 476.
55 Id.
49
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The court’s analysis was highly outcome determinative in focusing on the
harm posed by the most extreme form of polygyny in the FLDS movement.
The framing is curious since the court ruled that the statute did include the
criminalization of polyandrous and polyamorous unions. Indeed, the court held
that the law was sweeping in its application: “The offence is not directed at
multi-party, unmarried relationships or common law cohabitation, but is
directed at both polygyny and polyandry. It is also directed at multi-party same
sex marriages.”56 The mix of anecdotal evidence (with references to literature
and academic publications dealing with extreme polygynous unions)57
produced a less-than-compelling factual foundation for the decision. Indeed,
the court’s own view that the law sweeps from polygyny to polyamory to
plural same-sex marriage should have prompted a broader analysis of the
evidence of abuse in each of these groups and, by extension, plural
relationships as a whole. Instead, as do many of the advocates of continued
criminalization, the court kept most of the opinion tightly focused on the more
stereotypical and notorious polygyny cases. Thus, while refusing to interpret
the law narrowly to apply only to abusive or even just polygynous cases, the
court upheld the law against all groups by finding inherent abuses in all plural
unions. The court did not even address the many polygynous families in
Canada that have no record of any abuse or the ability of such families to have
polygynous relationships without such abuse. The latter point raises the
question of why the right to such a union is denied because it can be abused,
while the same standard is not applied to monogamous unions.
The court’s analysis of harm reveals four glaring, but all too common,
methodological errors. First, it brushed over the need to show harm posed by
non-polygynist plural unions by insisting that the relationships are poorly
defined and rarely raised in Canadian cases.58 Second, the court used past

56

Id. para. 1037.
Id. paras. 488–492. The court adopted a study of different books, including personal accounts, relating
to plural families as evidence. Id. para. 490 (“To determine whether the correlations between polygyny and the
harms identified in the literature can be generalized cross-culturally, one of the AG Canada’s witnesses
undertook a statistical analysis regarding polygyny and its relationship to a number of variables using data
from 172 countries.”).
58 The court used the variety of relationships under polyamorist unions, for example, to dismiss their
interests in decriminalization rather than acknowledge that the law sweeps across a broad range of unions. The
court found the following:
57

Assuming that any particular polyamorous relationship is captured by s. 293 as I have interpreted
it, I do not agree that the provision infringes their s. 2(a) rights. What evidence I have that
suggests that polyamorists are a discrete group sharing truly common principles is scant.

TURLEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:10 PM

THE LOADSTONE ROCK

1919

abuse references from studies and literature like the Jeffs case in the United
States59 without establishing the base number of polygynist unions, let alone
plural unions overall. Discussing individual cases like Jeffs’s does not reveal
the percentage of such abuses among plural families or establish that such
extreme cases are indicative of the wider array of such families for the
purposes of harm. There is little value to such studies without knowing the
prevalence of the abuses within a defined class.60 Third, the court created a
false comparison since it did not look at the rate of abuses associated with
monogamous marriages or non-married families despite the statistics showing
a growing number of unions in the latter category as discussed in the Wu
study. Obviously, there are a high number of cases of spousal and child abuse
in monogamous unions,61 but the court did not explore the inherent risk of such
abuse in those unions or suggest that monogamous unions might be properly
outlawed in light of such cases. Indeed, traditional marriage used to be based
on a principle of coverture, where a woman was viewed as an extension of her
husband’s interests and status.62 No one has suggested that such abusive
principles or practices should result in the criminalization of monogamous
marriage as a whole. Finally, and most importantly, the court assumed that
whatever rate of abuse that had occurred in polygynist unions was the inherent
and unchanging profile for this group. It ignored the effect of criminalization
of plural unions, which forces families outside of the mainstream and into
secretive compounds or communities.
As with much of the scholarship in this area, the court used acts that are
already criminalized like child or spousal abuses to justify the general
criminalization of a type of marriage. The harms identified by the court can be
Polyamory is, I conclude, a largely secular phenomenon, as varied in practice as the imagination
of its practitioners.
Id. para. 1094.
59 Id. paras. 327–331.
60 Ironically, such figures are hard to establish because of the criminalization of these families, which
have been forced largely underground by the threat of investigation and prosecution.
61 Indeed, some groups report that one out of every four women are victims of domestic abuse. See, e.g.,
Domestic Violence: Statistics & Facts, SAFEHORIZON, http://www.safehorizon.org/page/domestic-violencestatistics--facts-52.html (last visited May 17, 2015). Other groups put the number of children abused in homes
in the United States at over 3 million annually. See The Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ROUNDTABLE, http://www.domesticviolenceroundtable.org/effect-on-children.html (last visited
May 17, 2015). Given the court’s own presentation of the statistical dominance of monogamous families, the
vast majority of such cases occur in conventional families. However, no one would suggest that they are
indicative of the standard monogamous family or should be viewed as a basis for criminalizing monogamy.
62 See Jo Carrillo, The M Word: From Partial Coverture to Skills-Based Fiduciary Duties in Marriage,
22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 257 (2011).
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and are already addressed through the criminal code. The only harms not
directly addressed in the criminal code are the more subjective claims of
degradation of women or the threat to marriage as an institution. Those are
precisely the harms that are the most problematic, from a constitutional
perspective, in the imposition of majoritarian values on minority groups.
Indeed, the decision vividly demonstrates the danger of such normative
judgments as the basis for criminalizing consensual relations. While the
court—and many advocates—claim that the purpose of the law was to protect
women from subjugation,63 it is a rather dubious claim given the fact that in the
1800s, women lacked the right to vote and other core rights.64 The
rehabilitation of these laws as an effort to advance the rights of women is
rather implausible given the legal institutions maintaining discrimination
against women during this period. At most, the laws were meant to criminalize
alternative roles for women that departed from the conventional model of the
time, including the lesser status imposed on women by the state. A more
plausible view is that the original purposes of both the Canadian and U.S. laws
reflected an anti-Mormon norm and were part of a campaign where the
majority pursued an oppressed religious minority. Since such a purpose is now
anathema, a new purpose has arisen to protect women, including women who
are being protected against themselves in their desire to enter such
nontraditional unions.
The court’s narrow analysis and assumptions related to harm tend to
magnify the ultimate (and true) justification for upholding the law to protect
monogamous marriage and not just marriage:
When all is said, I suggest that the prohibition in s. 293 is
directed in part at protecting the institution of monogamous marriage.
And let me here recognize that we have come, in this century and in
this country, to accept same-sex marriage as part of that institution.
That is so, in part, because committed same-sex relationships
celebrate all of the values we seek to preserve and advance in
monogamous marriage.
The alarmist view expressed by some that the recognition of the
legitimacy of same-sex marriage will lead to the legitimization of
polygamy misses the whole point. . . . [T]he argument advanced by
63

Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 6, 352, 666.
Indeed, early feminists denounced the institution of marriage at the time as enslaving and abusive
toward women, including in the Seneca Falls Declaration. REPORT OF THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION 8–9
(Rochester, John Dick 1848) (“He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. He has taken
from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns.”).
64
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many, that “in this day and age” when we have adopted expansive
views of acceptable marriage units and common law living
arrangements, the acceptance of polygamy, or at least the
abandonment of its criminal prohibition, is the next logical step. This
is said in the context of the sentiment often expressed that the “State
has no business in the bedrooms of the Nation”. Here, I say it does
when in defence of what it views is a critical
institution - monogamous marriage - from attack by an
institution - polygamy - which is said to be inevitably associated with
serious harms.65

This statement perfectly captures the outcome-determinative use of harm in the
Bountiful opinion. The court ended up where many past cases like Reynolds
began—with a largely conclusory view that marriage by definition cannot
include plural unions of any kind. There was no exploration of what the
inherent value of marriage is and how it is missing in these unions. As with
same-sex marriage, most people would define the essence of marriage not
numerically but emotionally as the loving bond between adults. Instead, the
court simply pronounced that there can be no compatibility in the same way
that courts once dismissed interracial and same-sex unions.66 The conceptual
bias is revealed by the court’s framing of the question as the government’s
legitimate “defence of what it views is a critical institution - monogamous
marriage - from attack by an institution - polygamy - which is said to be
inevitably associated with serious harms.”67 Polygamists believe that they are
fighting for the institution of marriage rather than a different “institution”
attacking marriage. If the court is to base its decision on the serious harm
posed by plural unions to the institution of marriage, the court, at a minimum,
should explain why the heterosexual element of the original definition of
marriage is not controlling but the monogamous element continues to be
controlling. Otherwise, “harm” is little more than a conclusory term used to
mean any union that does not comply with majoritarian values. The harm
analysis proved little more than a thin veil for the same normative rationale
previously used to bar unpopular monogamous unions.

65

Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 1041–1042.
See, e.g., Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883); cf. Turley, supra note 7 (“Homosexuals and
polygamists do have a common interest: the right to be left alone as consenting adults. . . . There is no
spectrum of private consensual relations—there is just a right of privacy that protects all people so long as they
do not harm others.”).
67 Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 1042.
66
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B. The Brown Litigation
The Brown litigation began with the airing of a new reality television show
featuring a polygamous family in Utah, Sister Wives, on TLC.68 Kody Brown
is married to four women: Meri, Janelle, Christine, and Robyn. Kody’s
marriages to Meri, Janelle, and Christine all lasted over twenty years.69 With
the addition of his most recent wife, Robyn, Kody Brown has a total of
seventeen children. The Browns are members of a religious group that believes
polygamy is a core religious practice. While not part of the Church of
Latter-day Saints (LDS), they share fundamentalist values derived from the
LDS founders. They agreed to do the show as a way to show the public a
different type of polygamous family in the wake of the Warren Jeffs trial. Not
only were the Browns as appalled by Jeffs as were non-polygamists, their
family was based on completely different values, including full incorporation
in society, divorce, and equality of the sexes. Indeed, the Browns do not
pressure their children to be polygamous, and the adults came from both
monogamous and polygamous families. The success of the television program
is based in no small part on the fact that it has many of the issues and concerns
of traditional families. Their family is typical of many polygamous families in
a number of respects. First, they have never been accused of any criminal act
(despite years of intensive investigation). Second, they do not hold multiple
marriage licenses. Kody Brown’s marriage to his first wife, Meri, was a civil
marriage, but his other three unions are based on their shared religious beliefs
and constitute spiritually rather than legally defined unions. Most polygamous
families have never sought multiple licenses, and their plural families are
consensual relations adopted by the choice of the adults.
Like the Bountiful case, the controversy began with a criminal
investigation.70 After the airing of the pilot episode, Utah prosecutors publicly
declared that the family was committing felonies each night on television and
launched a criminal investigation to establish the basis for state charges.71 The
basis for the investigation was section 76-7-101 of the Utah Code, which
establishes that “[a] person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a
68 Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at para. 22, Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d
1240 (D. Utah 2012) [hereinafter Complaint].
69 One of the wives, Meri, recently legally divorced Kody Brown but is still part of the plural
relationship. Sister Wives Star Meri: “I Initiated Divorce from Kody,” FOX NEWS (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2015/02/18/sister-wives-star-meri-decided-to-legally-divorce-kody/.
70 For the record, I also served as lead counsel during the two years of criminal investigation targeting the
Brown family before I filed the challenge to the state law.
71 Complaint, supra note 68, para. 165.
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husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person
purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.”72
Obviously, the most problematic part of the law was not the prohibition on
multiple marriage licenses but the criminalization of “cohabitation”—a term
that encompasses a broad category of private relations in which a married
person “purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.”73
While prosecutions under the statute have been rare, published cases in the
last three decades only involve religious polygynists.74 Utah governmental
officials were aware of thousands of polygamist families in the state and
regularly interact with such families as part of the “Safety Net” program and
other governmental programs. Indeed, Utah governmental officials were aware
that the Brown family was a plural or polygamist family for years before the
first episode of Sister Wives aired on TLC.75 The record is uncontested that it
was the airing of the show that sparked the criminal investigation, an issue that
would later raise free speech issues in addition to claims under equal
protection, privacy, and other rights. One official connected to the
investigation publicly stated the program made prosecution “easier.”76
Prosecutors gave national interviews discussing the Brown family, their
alleged crime of polygamy, and the public investigation. Years of criminal
investigation, however, produced no evidence of a crime other than violation
of the cohabitation law.77 After a couple years of investigation and public
comments from prosecutors, the family went to federal court to challenge the
law itself.
The Browns originally sued Utah Governor Gary R. Herbert, Utah
Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, and Utah County Attorney Jeffrey R.
Buhman.78 However, Herbert and Shurtleff were later released from the case
after the court ruled that it was Buhman who had the most direct role in

72 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101(1) (West 2004), invalidated in part by Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp.
2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013).
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., State v. Jeffs, 243 P.3d 1250 (Utah 2010); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).
75 Complaint, supra note 68, para. 21.
76 Steven Nelson, “Sister Wives” Defeat Polygamy Law in Federal Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Dec. 16, 2013, 1:07 p.m. EST), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/16/sister-wives-defeatpolygamy-law-in-federal-court.
77 Past prosecutions under the law have often been combined with prosecutions for child rape, welfare
fraud, and other crimes.
78 Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Utah 2012).
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investigating and prosecuting the family.79 Over the course of litigation, it was
established that the statute was the outgrowth of a long-standing effort to ban
polygamy in the state, including a commitment to do so as a condition for
achieving statehood.80 The original purpose of the statute was to combat a
practice considered immoral. The question of harm was raised repeatedly over
the years of litigation at the trial level.81 The family, itself, presented a
compelling and tangible example that plural marriages can be maintained
without any abusive or criminal element. Indeed, the state helped establish that
fact after years of a determined criminal investigation that failed to produce a
single, even a minor, criminal act. The Browns were a happy family with
thriving children. The plural relationship is entirely consensual, and the adults
believe in the legal right of divorce—as shown recently with the divorce of
79 Ironically, it would be Shurtleff and his successor in the Brown litigation, John Swallow, who would
later be indicted rather than the Browns. Jonathan Turley, Former Utah Attorneys General Swallow and
Shurtleff Arrested, JONATHAN TURLEY: RES IPSA LOQUITOR (“THE THING ITSELF SPEAKS”) (July 15, 2014),
http://jonathanturley.org/2014/07/15/former-utah-attorneys-general-swallow-and-shurtleff-arrested/.
80 See, e.g., Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894). The result is a curious conflict in
the state constitution that is crafted to further the deep desire of religious freedom of the state’s founders while
yielding to the demand to prohibit a core religious practice. Article III of the Utah Constitution provides as
follows: “Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be
molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited.” UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1.
81 Harm was also raised as a question of injury for the Browns in the litigation over standing. Jonathan
Turley, Federal Court Rules Sister Wives Case Can Go Forward, JONATHAN TURLEY: RES IPSA LOQUITOR
(“THE THING ITSELF SPEAKS”) (Feb. 3, 2012), http://jonathanturley.org/2012/02/03/federal-court-rules-sisterwives-case-can-go-forward/. Prior challenges to the state law had been dismissed on standing grounds. The
state argued that, absent a prosecution, the family had no cognizable legal injury even though the law
effectively defined their entire family as an ongoing criminal enterprise. The state also ignored the public
statements made by prosecutors calling the family felons in public comments. The defendants submitted
affidavits saying that there was no intent to prosecute the Browns and that such prosecutions were extremely
rare. (Later, the State submitted an affidavit affirmatively promising not to prosecute the Browns in a mootness
challenge.) The court rejected the challenge to standing. Despite finding the law “moribund,” the court ruled
that the Browns had proven injury in individual and business affidavits submitted to the court showing
concrete personal and financial harm. Judge Waddoups then added to the findings the following powerful
statement:

As a final note, the court reiterates the Supreme Court’s comment that “when there is a danger of
chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible
may be outweighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged.” This interest is no
more prominently displayed than in a case such as this, where government officials make public
comments regarding the instigation of a criminal investigation in direct response to a party’s
exercise of free-speech and then, seek to bar Plaintiffs’ access to the courts and de facto strip
them of any opportunity to be heard. Such precedent would not create a simple slippery-slope,
but an unfettered path towards government harassment and abuse.
Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (quoting Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956
(1984)).
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Meri, who initiated the legal proceeding.82 The State repeatedly raised
generalized claims of abuse of women and children in oral argument and
written papers that were challenged as unsupported and anecdotal.83
It was the approach to the evidentiary basis for harm that distinguished the
opinion from its Canadian counterpart. Unlike Chief Justice Bauman, Judge
Waddoups refused to accept opinion or anecdotal evidence, consistent with
long-standing legal principles governing constitutional claims.84 The Browns
repeatedly stated a willingness to have a trial on harm, and the court repeatedly
pressed the State for concrete factual allegations of harm. The State could not
do so. Even if such evidence could be produced, the family asked whether
harm found in some plural unions could be enough to ban all such unions—a
standard that is not applied to monogamous unions. There was no question—as
shown by the Browns—that plural unions can occur between consenting adults
without any form of abuse. As shown in the Canadian litigation, many
arguments of harm were based on the work of advocates who found the very
notion of polygyny to be a form of male dominance.85 The court also diverged
from its Canadian counterpart in refusing to artificially narrow its analysis to
polygyny as opposed to the full range of plural unions criminalized under the
law.86 Not only did that full range further expose the lack of an evidentiary
basis for harm to support the law, it highlighted how the law was being used to
target unpopular religious practices and families.
Judge Waddoups’s lengthy opinion explored both the history and law on
the criminalization of plural unions. It stood in sharp contrast in its depth and
objectivity to the Canadian decision. Where Chief Justice Bauman cites the
Reynolds decision without acknowledging its racist and prejudicial content,
Judge Waddoups takes Reynolds head on and strips bare the bias shown in the
opinion:
82

See supra note 69. Meri was the only “wife” with a legal marriage certificate.
When lead counsel Jerry Jansen told the court that the newspapers are filled with accounts of abuse, I
offered to show a hundred-fold as many stories about monogamous families and asked if the court would
consider that sufficient evidence to criminalize monogamous unions.
84 Notably, courts routinely deny claims of the violation of constitutional rights on the basis that they are
subjective or insufficiently quantifiable or “concrete.” See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11, 26 (1972).
Yet, courts like the one in Bountiful routinely allow states to make such subjective claims as to immoral or
socially harmful conduct. Likewise, while the courts reject “anecdotal evidence and educated guesses” of the
government to support regulations, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1995), it is still
considered proper to use anecdotal evidence as in Bountiful when supporting morality legislation on the basis
of social harm.
85 See supra Part I.A.
86 See Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–1202.
83
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The court notes that 133 years after Reynolds, non-Mormon
counsel[87] for Plaintiffs have vigorously advanced arguments in
favor of the right of religious polygamists to practice polygamy
(through private “spiritual” marriages not licensed or otherwise
sanctioned by the state, a relationship to which the court will refer as
“religious cohabitation”) that would have perhaps delighted Mormon
Apostles and polygamy apologists throughout the period from 1852
to approximately 1904. To state the obvious, the intervening years
have witnessed a significant strengthening of numerous provisions of
the Bill of Rights, and a practical and morally defensible
identification of “penumbral” rights “of privacy and repose”
emanating from those key provisions of the Bill of Rights, as the
Supreme Court has over decades assumed a general posture that is
less inclined to allow majoritarian coercion of unpopular or disliked
minority groups, especially when blatant racism (as expressed
through Orientalism/imperialism), religious prejudice, or some other
constitutionally suspect motivation, can be discovered behind such
legislation.88

The court admitted to many months of introspection in finding this law to be
unconstitutional89 and further noted that “it is perhaps a bitter irony of the
history at issue here that it is possible to view the LDS Church as playing the
role of both victim and violator in the saga of religious polygamy in Utah (and
America).”90 Judge Waddoups had the integrity to ask “what exactly was the
‘social harm’” found in Reynolds and claimed by states like Utah.91 He found
87 This appears to be a reference to myself as lead counsel. Ironically, however, my local counsel (and
former student at George Washington Law School) Adam Alba is, in fact, a Mormon (as is Judge Waddoups).
Both men, in my view, came to represent not just the best of the Utah Bar but examples of principle and
courage.
88 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1181–82 (D. Utah 2013) (footnotes omitted).
89 Judge Waddoups acknowledged:

The proper outcome of this issue has weighed heavily on the court for many months as it has
examined, analyzed, and re-analyzed the numerous legal, practical, moral, and ethical
considerations and implications of today’s ruling. It would be an easy enough matter for the court
to do as the Defendant urges and find against the Plaintiffs on the question of religious
cohabitation under the Statute, defaulting simply to Reynolds v. United States without seriously
addressing the much developed constitutional jurisprudence that now protects individuals from
the criminal consequences intended by legislatures to apply to certain personal choices, though
such legislatures may sincerely believe that such criminal sanctions are in the best interest of
society. The court has concluded that this would not be the legally or morally responsible
approach in this case given the current contours of the constitutional protections at issue.
Id. at 1181 (citation omitted).
90 Id. at 1184 (footnote omitted).
91 Id. at 1186.
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the inescapable truth to be that the “harm” found in Reynolds—that continues
to be cited by advocates—was based on a prejudice against the moral choices
of consenting adults in framing their lives and families along their values and
faiths.
Judge Waddoups also stands in sharp contrast to the past decisions of the
Utah Supreme Court, which are heavily laden with bias as vividly shown by an
opinion of Utah Justice Ronald Nehring. In 2006, Nehring wrote an opinion
that was as shocking as Reynolds in its open acknowledgement of personal
animus or bias against polygamists.92 In rejecting a challenge to the law,
Justice Nehring expanded the harm of polygamy to the damage done to the
image of Utah and Mormons: “No matter how widely known the natural
wonders of Utah may become, no matter the extent that our citizens earn
acclaim for their achievements, in the public mind Utah will forever be
shackled to the practice of polygamy.”93 Nehring was remarkably frank in
admitting that this hostility “has been present in [his] consciousness, and [he]
suspect[s] has been a brooding presence . . . in the minds of [his] colleagues,
from the moment [they] opened the parties’ briefs.”94 Rather than overcome
that prejudice, Nehring not only yielded to it but warned any Utah judge of the
peril of being the first to recognize the rights of polygamists: “I have not been
alone in speculating what the consequences might be were the highest court in
the State of Utah the first in the nation to proclaim that polygamy enjoys
constitutional protection.”95 The Nehring opinion was a shocking display of
personal prejudice and animus. However, he was at least honest, whereas past
judges have cloaked their animus in more neutral or conclusory language.

92

State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 752 (Utah 2006) (Nehring, J., concurring).
Id. at 753.
94 Id.
95 Id. Like Judge Waddoups, however, there remain jurists in Utah who reject such open bias in analysis,
including former Chief Justice Christine M. Durham, who wrote a masterful dissenting opinion that called out
her colleagues for failing to afford a religious minority the protections of the state and federal constitutions. In
State v. Holm, Durham wrote,
93

While some in society may feel that the institution of marriage is diminished when individuals
consciously choose to avoid it, it is generally understood that the state is not entitled to criminally
punish its citizens for making such a choice, even if they do so with multiple partners or with
partners of the same sex.
Id. at 773 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Like the two cases explored in this Article,
these two justices, in a single decision, offer the best and the worst of analysis of harm in modern
constitutional analysis.
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Judge Waddoups not only overcame such bias but stripped bare such bias
in his detailed constitutional analysis. At the time of Reynolds, the mere
statement of the prejudice against Mormons for what the Court called an
“odious” religion was enough to establish the harm.96 Indeed, ten years later,
the Court satisfied the same burden by declaring that Mormon practices
constituted “a return to barbarism” that were “contrary to the spirit of
Christianity.”97 Judge Waddoups rejected the conclusory notion of harm as
anathematic to modern legal principles.98
Brown was particularly illuminating on the role and meaning of social harm
because it involved a host of constitutional claims with different constitutional
standards from strict scrutiny99 to intermediate scrutiny100 to rational basis
analysis.101 Yet, even under the lowest rational basis test, the State was
96
97
98

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890).
Judge Waddoups noted,
In other words, the social harm was introducing a practice perceived to be characteristic of
non-European people—or non-white races—into white American society. “The organization of a
community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is
contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the
Western world.” This observation in Late Corp.—unthinkable as part of the legal analysis in a
modern Supreme Court decision given the significant (and appropriate) development in the
interpretation of the protections afforded to religious minorities under both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause in the latter half of the twentieth century, and racial
minorities under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as
also recognized in the latter half of the twentieth century—was only a reiteration of the definitive
position already taken by the Supreme Court more than a decade earlier in Reynolds. Such an
assessment arising from derisive societal views about race and ethnic origin prevalent in the
United States at that time has no place in discourse about religious freedom, due process, equal
protection or any other constitutional guarantee or right in the genuinely and intentionally racially
and religiously pluralistic society that has been strengthened by the Supreme Court’s
twentieth-century rights jurisprudence.

Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1188 (D. Utah 2013) (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting Late
Corp., 136 U.S. at 49).
99 See, e.g., id. at 1190. Since the court found that the cohabitation language was “not operationally
neutral or of general applicability because of its targeted effect on specifically religious cohabitation,” it found
that the State could not show a compelling state interest and a narrowly tailored rule. Id.
100 Id. The court also found that “Smith’s hybrid rights exception requires the court to apply a form of
heightened scrutiny to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, including their Due Process claim, since each of those
constitutional claims are ‘reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns,’ in light of the specifically religious
nature of Plaintiffs’ cohabitation.” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881
(1990)).
101 Id. (“Alternatively, following Lawrence and based on the arguments presented by Defendant in both
his filings and at oral argument, the State of Utah has no rational basis under the Due Process Clause on which
to prohibit the type of religious cohabitation at issue here . . . .”).
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required to show more than moral outrage or majoritarian values to justify the
criminalization of consensual adult conduct. Indeed, the court noted that the
abuses repeatedly raised by the State were already fully prosecutable under
rape and abuse laws as well as laws governing welfare fraud.102 Moreover, the
Court juxtaposed this weak rational basis for the law against “the deeper
liberty interests at issue in the home and personal relationships.”103
In the end, Judge Waddoups agreed that the state was violating the full
gambit of rights raised in the Complaint.104 The Browns argued that the court
could simply strike the cohabitation language of the law and effectively leave
the state with the same type of bigamy law of other states, criminalizing the
possession of multiple marriage licenses. The court agreed and found that the
cohabitation language was facially unconstitutional as a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
as without a rational basis under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.105
II. COMPULSIVE LIBERALISM AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE
The Bountiful and Brown decisions offer sharp contrasts, not only in the
manner in which they factored harm into constitutional analysis but also with
respect to the kind and amount of evidence required to establish such harm.
Chief Justice Bauman struggled to offer an objective analysis of harm and
inevitably not only confined the key analysis to polygyny but fell back on the
traditional normative “defense of marriage” arguments. Conversely, Judge
Waddoups separated the normative from the objective harms associated with
plural unions as a whole. The different treatment given to harm in the two
opinions shows both the determinative role harm plays in such controversies
102

Id. at 1224–25 (rejecting the law as a rational basis for combatting welfare fraud since “it is ‘difficult
to understand how those in polygamous relationships that are ineligible to receive legal sanction are
committing welfare abuse when they seek benefits available to unmarried persons’” (quoting State v. Holm,
137 P.3d 726, 777 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
103 Id. at 1224.
104 The court would reserve one count under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 2014, the court ruled that the Browns
had succeeded in showing that state officials, and particularly Mr. Buhman, acted to deny protected
constitutional rights ranging from free speech to free exercise to equal protection. The court further ordered the
full recovery under the federal law, including attorneys’ fees and costs. See Brown v. Herbert, 43 F. Supp. 3d
1229 (D. Utah 2014); see also Jonathan Turley, Federal Court Rules State Officials Violated the Constitutional
Rights of the Brown Family in the Sister Wives Case, JONATHAN TURLEY: RES IPSA LOQUITOR (“THE THING
ITSELF SPEAKS”) (Aug. 27, 2014), http://jonathanturley.org/2014/08/27/federal-court-rules-state-officialsviolated-section-1983-in-sister-wives-case/ (linking to the Section 1983 opinion).
105 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1221–25.
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and the lack of any consistent approach to defining harm in modern cases.
Under the Reynolds and Bountiful analysis, harm becomes little more than the
violation of majoritarian values. In Brown, the court strove for a more
objective basis for harm. That foundation can be found in utilitarian theories
like those put forward by Jeremy Bentham and, most clearly, in the later work
of John Stuart Mill and his “Harm Principle.”
A. John Stuart Mill and the Harm Principle
Mill is widely associated with his foundational utilitarian theories and his
refinement of the work of Jeremy Bentham on the proper basis and function of
state action.106 Bentham’s view of government as achieving “the greatest
happiness of the greatest number”107 was revolutionary at its time and opened
up a wide array of programs designed to transform and not simply regulate
society. Bentham also articulated a view of morality that was equally
revolutionary. Indeed, it would still be considered revolutionary by many.
Bentham believed that achieving the greatest good for the greatest number
meant increasing the pleasures of citizens and that something was morally right
if its consequences led to happiness or the absence of pain.108 His “felicific
calculus” was meant to maximize individual freedom by measuring the relative
quantities of pleasure and pain resulting from different private and public
actions.109 Bentham resisted efforts to confine that individual pursuit and even
questioned his own calculus in being able to measure pains and pleasures,
admitting, “Tis in vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will
continue distinct as they were before, one man’s happiness will never be
another man’s happiness.”110 Bentham, however, viewed that as precisely the
reason that society needed to minimize moral codes that dictated one set of
moral values or actions over another.

106

See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1863).
JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 93 (F.C. Montague ed., London, Oxford Univ.
Press 1891) (1776).
108 OVERTON H. TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 120 (1960).
109 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 29–30
(London, Oxford Univ. Press 1879) (1789) (measuring, “[t]o a person considered by himself, the value of
pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to the . . . following circumstances: 1. Its
intensity. 2. Its duration. 3. Its certainty . . . . 4. Its propinquity or remoteness . . . . 5. Its fecundity . . . 6. Its
purity” as well as when considering “a number of persons” “its extent”).
110 Wesley C. Mitchell, Bentham’s Felicific Calculus, 33 POL. SCI. Q. 161, 167 (1918) (quoting 3 ÉLIE
HALÉVY, RADICALISME PHILOSOPHIQUE 481 (1904)).
107

TURLEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:10 PM

THE LOADSTONE ROCK

1931

Benthamite theories remain attractive to privacy advocates, particularly
those opposing morality legislation, due to its recognition of the inherent right
of individuals to pursue pleasure in life. However, like harm, pleasure can be a
precarious element to define. In what Frederick Schauer called “majoritarian
hedonistic utilitarian[ism],”111 John Ely defined the good of utilitarianism in
terms of securing happiness or pleasure.112 However, Ely left defining such
“good” to the political process, which can loop society back to the problem of
coerced majoritarian morality. It does little from an individual-rights approach
if the majority continues to decide what are acceptable pleasures and what
effectively become unacceptable pleasures. Bentham himself believed that
such a good could be defined by seven inherent characteristics: intensity,
duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity, and extent.113 Bentham
suggests that an action is morally right to the extent that it results in greater
happiness (or less pain), and conversely it is immoral to the extent that it leads
to unhappiness (or more pain). His bold new view of morality certainly has
continued relevance to many contemporary debates over lifestyles and
nontraditional unions. It is a rejection of the role of society in generally
dictating moral conduct. However, Bentham’s writings on the “sovereign
masters” of pain and pleasure leave the defining “good” element of
utilitarianism dangerously undefined. Indeed, Bentham questioned the ability
of a legislature to know the essence of the good in the pursuit of pleasure,
given the uncertainty and variety of such views of individuals.114 The
definitional foundations of Bentham’s approach also runs into difficulty with
the spiritual side of human action: the adoption of values and practices that
transcend immediate satisfaction or pleasure. Mill saw Bentham’s writings as
flawed by the omission of such “spiritual” motivations:
Man is conceived by Bentham as a being susceptible of pleasures
and pains, and governed in all his conduct partly by the different
modifications of self-interest, and the passions commonly classed as
selfish, partly by sympathies, or occasionally antipathies, towards

111

Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653, 658 (1991).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
113 BENTHAM, supra note 109, at 29–30.
114 See id. at 319 (“It is a standing topic of complaint, that a man knows too little of himself. Be it so: but
is it so certain that the legislature must know more? It is plain, that of individuals the legislature can know
nothing: concerning those points of conduct which depend upon the particular circumstances of each
individual, it is plain, therefore, that he can determine nothing to advantage. It is only with respect to those
broad lines of conduct in which all persons, or very large and permanent descriptions of persons, may be in a
way to engage, that he can have any pretence for interfering . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
112
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other beings. And here Bentham’s conception of human nature
stops. . . .
Man is never recognized by him as a being capable of pursuing
spiritual perfection as an end; of desiring, for its own sake, the
conformity of his own character to his standard of excellence,
without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than his own
inward consciousness. Even in the more limited form of Conscience,
this great fact of human nature escapes him. Nothing is more curious
than the absence of recognition in any of his writings of the existence
of conscience, as a thing distinct from philanthropy, from affection
for God or man, and from self-interest in this world or the next.115

Privacy, free association, and free exercise are values that transcend the types
of pleasures and pains that Bentham defined.116 Nevertheless, Bentham’s view
of pleasure did contain a type of harm qualifier as evidenced by his opposition
to anti-sodomy laws.117 Despite his own dislike for homosexual relations,
Bentham saw the laws as violating the principle of the greatest good for the
greatest number since it denied pleasure to a group while adding social costs
by criminalizing the conduct.118
Where Bentham sought to delineate pains and pleasures in defining the
proper role of government, Mill approached the question of the legitimacy of
governmental action by isolating harm as a defining element. Mill’s classic
description of the foundation for state power came in his work On Liberty:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can

115 JOHN STUART MILL, Bentham, in ESSAYS ON ETHICS, RELIGION AND SOCIETY 75, 94–95 (J.M. Robson
ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1969) (1838).
116 Indeed, critics often focus on more selfish or abusive elements of unpopular unions like plural
relationships. At the same time, opinions like Bountiful largely ignore the spiritual elements of these unions. It
is not simply the religious foundations for polygamy but also the more spiritual (but secular) connections
described in polyamorous, polyandrous, or group-home relationships.
117 Jeremy Bentham, An Essay on “Paederasty” (1785), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY AND SEX 316 (Robert
B. Baker & Kathleen J. Wininger eds., 4th ed. 2009).
118 William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1339 (2000) (“Because such laws deprived
consenting adults of activities that were congenitally pleasurable to them, created opportunities for false
accusations and extortion, and encouraged unproductive prejudices, their overall social costs greatly exceeded
their benefits.”).
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be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.119

This harm principle offers a less subjective basis for governmental action—
conditioning state action on a showing of harm. Indeed, in an age of regulation,
addressing defined harms would become the touchstone for the society in
seeking utilitarian solutions to social ills. However, Mill himself acknowledged
that harm could itself be given an expansive meaning—a meaning that would
defeat the limiting elements of the principle:
The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person’s life
which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many
persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of
the conduct of a member of a society be a matter of indifference to
the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is
impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently
hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least his near
connections, and often far beyond them.120

Mill clearly saw the Achilles’ heel of any harm-based theory in the elastic
interpretation of the term, particularly in the adoption of normative or moral
harms to society. Notably, the harm principle was long embraced by liberal
scholars as an answer to morality legislation. However, the notion of social
harm has been reintroduced by feminist scholars in seeking the criminalization
of pornography, plural relationships, and other targeted conduct.121
B. Social Harm and the Rise of Compulsive Liberalism
Where the harm principle was once the answer to conservative morality
legislation, feminist scholars have embraced arguments based on majoritarian
morality or values to seek to criminalize some forms of consensual conduct.
These “bad choices” are consensual but still harmful in the view of these
scholars. This trend in some scholarship, and legislative measures, can be
called “compulsive liberalism”—an effort to compel the correct choices or
conduct in society.122 Liberal scholars are increasingly answering Judge

119
120
121

(1999).

MILL, supra note 15, at 23.
Id. at 154.
See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109

122 Professor Harcourt referred to this trend as “conservative liberalism” to capture the same ironic shift in
legal theory. Id. at 116 (“The emergence of conservative liberalism represents the ironic culmination of a long
debate between liberal theorists and their critics. It is ironic because it symbolizes a victory for both sides.
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Waddoups’s question of “what exactly was the ‘social harm’” by citing
perceived inequalities, objectification, or domination as harms. There is only a
slight translational difference reflected in nineteenth-century cases like
Reynolds and the twenty-first century work of some academics. Where the
Reynolds Court referred to Christian values, it also cited the desire to combat a
“patriarchal principle,” which, “when applied to large communities, fetters the
people in stationary despotism.”123 Now, such rationales for criminalization
more often speak of subjugation and discrimination. Indeed, the experts in the
Bountiful litigation returned to the evils of “patriarchal family structures” to
support the prosecution of those with contrary values.124 While advocates for
new limitations on speech and conduct may view themselves as inherently
distinct from the legal moralist of prior centuries, compulsive liberalism has
returned society to a debate over the concept of social harm and the limitations
of consensual conduct among adults.
In adopting broader expressions of harm, scholars are building on the
illiberal theories of such figures as Lord Patrick Devlin. In his famous
Maccabaean Lecture at the British Academy in 1959, Lord Devlin argued that
immorality alone is a social harm worthy of criminal sanctions. Legal
moralism was opposed by such figures as H.L.A. Hart, who sought to
distinguish between the legal and the moral while reinforcing the “rules of
recognition” in constitutional process.125 Indeed, legal moralism was once
relegated to the dustbin of history by liberal scholars arguing against the
criminalization of homosexuality, fornication, adultery, and other “social ills.”
Devlin voiced the view of law as dictating correct values—reinforced by the
coercive power of the state:
Immorality then, for the purpose of the law, is what every
right-minded person is presumed to consider to be immoral. Any
immorality is capable of affecting society injuriously and in effect to
a greater or lesser extent it usually does; this is what gives the law its
locus standi.126

It was clear to figures like Devlin that Mill’s writings posed a threat to
morality codes generally and that Mill did not consider moral injury to fall

Liberal theory prevails in the sense that the harm principle is hegemonic—if only in theory. The critics of
1960s liberalism prevail in the sense that morality gets enforced—if only under a liberal regime.”).
123 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
124 See Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 271, 599 (Can.).
125 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94–96 (2d ed. 1994).
126 PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 15 (1965).
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within the harms justifying state action. Another British jurist, Lord James
Fitzjames Stephen in his book, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, also criticized the
key aspect to Mill’s theories.127 Stephen insisted “that there are acts of
wickedness so gross and outrageous that, self-protection apart, they must be
prevented as far as possible at any cost to the offender, and punished, if they
occur, with exemplary severity.”128 Regardless of whether the “exemplary
severity” is needed to advance a moral code like the prohibition on sodomy or
a normative value like equality, the point of such writings is that the criminal
code is a vehicle for shaping and maintaining a social code.
The broad treatment of social harm advanced by figures like Devlin echo in
contemporary arguments by those seeking to curtail speech or consensual
conduct. While not arguing for morality per se, feminist scholars have argued
for the criminalization of conduct deemed subjugating or demeaning to
women. In her book, In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings
(with Andrea Dworkin), Catharine MacKinnon offers an excellent example of
how the concept of harm can be expanded to cover consensual adult conduct in
the area of pornography.129 The title of the book, In Harm’s Way, captures the
new moral liberalism expressed in utilitarian terms.
Pornography constructs what a woman is in terms of its view of
what men want sexually . . . . Pornography’s world of equality is a
harmonious and balanced place. Men and women are perfectly
complementary and perfectly bipolar. . . . All the ways men love to
take and violate women, women love to be taken and violated. . . .
....
What pornography does goes beyond its content: It eroticizes
hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance and
submission sex. Inequality is its central dynamic; the illusion of
freedom coming together with the reality of force is central to its
working. . . .
[P]ornography is neither harmless fantasy nor a corrupt and
confused misrepresentation of an otherwise neutral and healthy
sexual situation. It institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy,
fusing the erotization of dominance and submission with the social
127

This criticism of Mill is explored by Professor Harcourt in his article on the harm principle. See
Harcourt, supra note 121.
128 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 163 (New York, Holt & Williams
1873).
129 IN HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea
Dworkin eds., 1997).
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construction of male and female. . . . Men treat women as who they
see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men’s
power over women means that the way men see women defines who
women can be. Pornography . . . . is a sexual reality.130

While assigning a host of social ills to the watching of pornography,
MacKinnon’s defense of anti-pornography legislation in Minneapolis and other
cities disregards the consent or choice of women involved in pornography as
not truly consensual but habitualized.131 Indeed, the statutory language negated
even contractual consent as a defense between consenting adults. “Coercion
into pornographic performance” is defined as “[c]oercing, intimidating or
fraudulently inducing any person . . . into performing for pornography.”132
However, among the types of proof that are statutorily barred as a defense are
[t]hat the person actually consented to a use of the performance that
is changed into pornography; . . . [t]hat the person knew that the
purpose of the acts or events in question was to make
pornography; . . . [t]hat the person signed a contract, or made
statements affirming a willingness to cooperate in the production of
pornography; . . . [t]hat no physical force, threats, or weapons were
used in the making of the pornography; . . . [and t]hat the person was
paid or otherwise compensated.133

The law further states that a woman may file a complaint “as a woman acting
against the subordination of women” with the office of equal opportunity.134
That language was ultimately found unconstitutional in American Booksellers
Ass’n v. Hudnut by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote for the court in saying that the statute was rife
with content restrictions based on approved and disapproved images of
women:

130 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 17–
18 (1985) (footnote omitted).
131 The proposed law was adopted in three jurisdictions: Minneapolis, Minnesota; Indianapolis, Indiana;
and Bellingham, Washington. See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and
Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 app. A at 24–28 (1985).
132 Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (alteration and omission in
original) (quoting INDIANAPOLIS, IN., CODE § 16-3(g)(5) (1984)).
133 Id. (quoting INDIANAPOLIS, IN., CODE § 16-3(g)(5)).
134 Id. at 326 (quoting INDIANAPOLIS, IN., CODE § 16-17(b)); see also id. (“A man, child, or transsexual
also may protest trafficking ‘but must prove injury in the same way that a woman is injured . . . .’
Subsection (a) also provides, however, that ‘any person claiming to be aggrieved’ by trafficking, coercion,
forcing, or assault may complain against the ‘perpetrators.’” (omission in original) (quoting INDIANAPOLIS, IN.,
CODE § 16-17(b))).
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Under the ordinance graphic sexually explicit speech is
“pornography” or not depending on the perspective the author adopts.
Speech that “subordinates” women and also, for example, presents
women as enjoying pain, humiliation, or rape, or even simply
presents women in “positions of servility or submission or display” is
forbidden, no matter how great the literary or political value of the
work taken as a whole. Speech that portrays women in positions of
equality is lawful, no matter how graphic the sexual content. This is
thought control. It establishes an “approved” view of women, of how
they may react to sexual encounters, of how the sexes may relate to
each other. Those who espouse the approved view may use sexual
images; those who do not, may not.135

Professor MacKinnon has championed the view that society can choose a value
and sanction actions based on alternative values. After all, MacKinnon asks,
“[I]f a woman is subjected, why should it matter that the work has other
value?”136 For MacKinnon, there is an inherent truth to her view, and tolerance
must be limited in shaping a society around such truths. It is one of two forms
of liberalism, where tolerance is a vehicle for achieving social consensus rather
than an objective in itself.137 The view of tolerance as a vehicle stands in
contrast to the alternative form of liberalism represented as modus vivendi,
where society is not structured to achieve a particular truth but to allow
everyone to seek their own truth, allowing for true pluralism of not just ideas
but relationships.138
135
136
137

Id. at 328.
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 202 (1989).
John Gray explained the two different views:
Liberalism contains two philosophies. In one, toleration is justified as a means to truth. In this
view, toleration is an instrument of rational consensus, and a diversity of ways of life is endured
in the faith that it is destined to disappear. In the other, toleration is valued as a condition of
peace, and divergent ways of living are welcomed as marks of diversity in the good life. The first
conception supports an ideal of ultimate convergence on values, the latter an ideal of modus
vivendi. Liberalism’s future lies in turning its face away from the ideal of rational consensus and
looking instead to modus vivendi.

JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 105 (2000).
138 The effort to criminalize pornography by scholars like MacKinnon would (and indeed has already)
failed to satisfy a Millian standard of harm. More difficult questions arise for issues like prostitution, where
some claim a closer nexus of the conduct to criminal acts. However, there remains a great deal of conflict in
such arguments both statistically and legally. Statistically, prostitution runs into the same problem of how to
measure the harm and more specifically the relevant group for analysis. There is a great deal of difference
between “street walking” and the type of prostitution practiced in jurisdictions in Nevada and Europe, where
prostitution is regulated and confined to businesses. There is also the continuing legal conflict in criminalizing
consensual prostitution while protecting the same sexual acts as part of adult movies. Both are done for money
and both acts are between relative strangers. Yet, one is a crime and one is a lawful industry. The conceptual
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The view of liberalism as seeking to establish core truths or correct
thinking is evident in the writings of various academics seeking limitations on
free speech and free exercise. While the free exercise elements of the Brown
and Bountiful cases predominate in public discussions, these cases also involve
core free speech rights. This is particularly the case with the Browns, who were
only put under criminal investigation when they went public with a television
show featuring their plural family. These cases reflect a dangerous and
growing trend in the West in curtailing speech rights in the interests of the
same notions of social cohesion and, ironically, tolerance. Speech itself is
being redefined according to whether it is viewed as socially harmful or
permissible.
The attack on free speech is particularly evident in countries like Canada in
the expanding use of hate-speech and antidiscrimination laws.139 Free speech
was once the very touchstone of liberalism with academics challenging,
through their writings, a host of laws designed to limit the content of public
and private discourse. However, a counter-movement began to grow in the late
twentieth century as writers advocated the criminalization of speech deemed
offensive, racist, hateful, or sexist. Advocates argued that speech had to be
curtailed to guarantee tolerance—a logic rejected by many in the free speech
community. However, hate crime and antidiscrimination laws expanded in
various countries and, in Canada, human rights commissions were increasingly
in the news for investigating people who wrote and said insulting things about
religion, different races, or homosexuality.140
conflict is precisely the type that Mill sought to avoid with a narrower definition of harm as the basis for
criminal law. A case might still be made for the comprehensive criminalization of prostitution. There are
documented harms and abuses in many cases. However, the case has to be made on the basis of conventional
causation with provable harm tied directly to the practice as a whole. Once the compelled morality rationale is
stripped away, such a debate can occur on the basis of demonstrable and measurable facts.
139 See Jonathan Turley, Just Say No to Blasphemy Laws, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 2009, at 11a; Jonathan
Turley, Op-Ed., Shut Up and Play Nice: How the Western World Is Limiting Free Speech, WASH. POST,
Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shut-up-and-play-nice-how-the-western-world-islimiting-free-speech/2012/10/12/e0573bd4-116d-11e2-a16b-2c110031514a_story.html [hereinafter Turley,
Shut Up and Play Nice]; Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., Speech Under Fire, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, at A17,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/09/opinion/la-oe-turley-criminalizing-speech-20120309
[hereinafter Turley, Speech Under Fire]; Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., The Threat to French Free Speech Isn’t
Terrorism. It’s the French, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2015, at B1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-it-means-to-stand-with-charlie-hebdo/2015/01/08/ab41621496e8-11e4-aabd-d0b93ff613d5_story.html [hereinafter Turley, The Threat to French Free Speech].
140 The case emerging from Canada on the curtailment of free speech can only be described as alarming.
See, e.g., Turley, Speech Under Fire, supra note 139 (“In Canada last year, comedian Guy Earle was found to
have violated the human rights of a lesbian couple by making insulting comments at a nightclub.”); Jonathan
Turley, Oh Canada! Alberta Human Rights Commission Punishes and Censures Anti-Gay Speech, JONATHAN
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The crackdown on free speech was accelerated after 2005 when Muslims
around the world burned churches and killed non-Muslims in response to the
publication of Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad. While
Western countries publicly professed fealty to free speech, there appeared a
steady increase in prosecutions for speech deemed insulting or offensive to
religious groups. This trend continued after a similar spasm of violence in 2012
with the release of a video called “Innocence of Muslims” on YouTube. In a
telling statement at the time, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned that
“when some people use this freedom of expression to provoke or humiliate
some others’ values and beliefs, then this cannot be protected.”141 The
statement captured perfectly the idea that tolerance is merely a vehicle for
achieving a central truth in society rather than protecting the right to hold and
voice different values. This was amplified shortly later, before the United
Nations, by Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, who declared that “[o]ur
tolerance must never extend to tolerating religious hatred.”142 The trend has
continued even after the 2015 “Charlie Hebdo” massacre in Paris and the
massive march in support of free speech in France.143
While the United States has tended to resist the trend toward greater speech
regulation that is evident in England, France, and Canada, nonetheless, the
same sentiment has been voiced in courts in the United States.144 From efforts
to bar certain advertisements in subways145 to calls for criminal investigations
of speakers, there is a fundamental shift in the view of the role of free speech
and more generally the meaning of tolerance in society. This shift is pushing
these countries back to arguments long rejected in the curtailment of speech.

TURLEY: RES IPSA LOQUITOR (“THE THING ITSELF SPEAKS”) (June 9, 2008), http://jonathanturley.org/2008/
06/09/oh-canada-alberta-human-rights-commission-punishes-and-censures-anti-gay-speech/ (“The Alberta
Human Rights Commission has punished Rev. Stephen Boission and the Concerned Christian Coalition for
anti-gay speech, not only awarding damages but censuring future speech that the Commission deems
inappropriate.”); Jonathan Turley, Maclean’s Magazine Faces Speech Police in Canada, JONATHAN TURLEY:
RES IPSA LOQUITOR (“THE THING ITSELF SPEAKS”) (June 13, 2008), http://jonathanturley.org/2008/06/
13/macleans-magazine-faces-speech-police-in-canada/ (“The magazine is accused of hate speech and has had
to answer for the publication of an article written by Mark Steyn entitled Why the Future Belongs to Islam.”).
141 Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice, supra note 139.
142 Id.
143 Turley, The Threat to French Free Speech, supra note 139.
144 One of the most infamous examples was a 2009 controversy involving a charge against a Muslim man
who attacked an atheist marching in a Halloween parade as a “zombie Muhammed.” Turley, Shut Up and Play
Nice, supra note 139. When the case was heard, Pennsylvania Judge Mark Martin chastised not the defendant
but the victim, Ernie Perce, lecturing him that “our forefathers intended to use the First Amendment so we can
speak with our mind, not to piss off other people and cultures—which is what you did.” Id.
145 Id.
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While earlier limitations were justified as fighting immorality, there is growing
consensus to impose similar limitations to fight racism, sexism, or hate.
Indeed, the Obama Administration shocked many in the free speech
community with its early support of an international standard for the
criminalization of speech long opposed by the United States.146 The
Administration supported the passage of a resolution in the U.N. Human
Rights Council to create an international standard restricting some
anti-religious speech.147 Longtime advocates of an international blasphemy
standard celebrated the victory as an alternative construction of a blasphemy
law with the support of the United States.148 These states had long criminalized
anti-religious speech on the basis that it was an incitement to violence. At the
time, “Egypt’s U.N. ambassador heralded the resolution as exposing the ‘true
nature’ of free speech and recognizing that ‘freedom of expression has been
sometimes misused’ to insult religion.”149 Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of
State, invited delegates to work on the international standard by referring to
“sectarian clashes” that were not “fair game.”150 Clinton called on countries to
work together on the new international standard “to build those muscles”
needed “to avoid a return to the old patterns of division.”151 Free speech, itself,
146 Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 347 (2011); Javaid Rehman & Stephanie E. Berry, Is “Defamation of Religions” Passé? The
United Nations, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Islamic State Practices: Lessons from Pakistan,
44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 431 (2012).
147 The resolution, “Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping, Stigmatization of, and Discrimination,
Incitement to Violence and Violence Against Persons, Based on Religion or Belief,” was long sought by
Muslim countries, which routinely arrest and even execute people for speech offending religion. Human
Rights Council Res. 16/18, Combating Intolerance, Negative Stereotyping and Stigmatization of, and
Discrimination, Incitement to Violence and Violence Against, Persons Based on Religion or Belief, 16th Sess.,
Mar. 24, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/docs/16session/A.HRC.RES.16.18_en.pdf.
148 Commentators agreed with this assessment. Blitt, supra note 146, at 377 (“By failing to decisively
invalidate the chimera of defamation of religion, the UN has allowed the OIC to advocate its continued
legality, including by openly asserting that implementation of Resolution 16/18 is one possible ‘alternative
approach’ to achieving the end goal of shielding religious beliefs from criticism and insult.”); Rehman &
Berry, supra note 146, at 433 (“Notwithstanding this apparent departure from explicit references to
‘defamation of religions’ in the UN, this Article identifies a continuing trend on the part of the OIC and its
members towards the banning and criminalization of all forms of ‘defamation of religions’ and protecting and
promoting analogous domestic anti-blasphemy laws.”); see also Caleb Holzaepfel, Comment, Can I Say
That?: How an International Blasphemy Law Pits the Freedom of Religion Against the Freedom of Speech,
28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 597, 633 (2014) (“These laws purport to adopt traditional Western standards of free
speech, while simultaneously prosecuting actions that offend or oppress religious belief systems.”).
149 Turley, Shut Up and Play Nice, supra note 139.
150 Id.
151 Turley, The Threat to French Free Speech, supra note 139. The new rationale for speech limits has
even deeper support in academia, where scholars have sought to draw distinctions between good and bad
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had become the cause of social harms that could be curtailed not just
domestically but internationally.
These rollbacks on free speech reflect a redefining sense of harm being
embraced in the West. Canadian courts have been particularly receptive to that
view of public morality as a foundation for criminal law. This was evident in
R. v. Butler, where the Canadian Supreme Court laid out the standard for
obscenity crimes as a reflection of majoritarian values.152 The decision of
Justice Sopinka incorporated contemporary views of “public morality” into the
legitimate exercise of criminal sanctions. This included three tests that
redefined harm to simply reflect the majority’s shifting attitudes of what is
socially or morally harmful. Under the “Community Standard of Tolerance”
Test, the Court looks at whether the subject has violated society’s view of
acceptable sexual representation.153 A second “Degradation or
Dehumanization” test looks at whether the material includes elements that are
viewed as exploitative, demeaning, or “portray violence and cruelty in
conjunction with sex.”154 This degradation standard fits well with the
arguments made against plural unions: the consent of the adult participants is
material if they are deemed as making bad choices. The third test allows for
“internal necessities” or an artistic defense based on any artistic or literary
merit.155 The case is illustrative of how modern courts eschew prior moralistic
language but ultimately embrace the same concept of morality as a legitimate
state interest. Sopinka rejected the 1868 standard of R. v. Hicklin,156 which he
viewed as outdated and potentially abusive in its effort “to advance a particular
conception of morality.”157 However, his tests still embrace the right to
speech. Perhaps the most striking example was the actions taken by Yale University Press, which in 2009
published a book about the Danish cartoons by Jytte Klausen entitled THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE
WORLD—but cut all of the cartoons because the cartoons were deemed offensive. See Statement by John
Donatich, Director, Yale Univ. Press (Sept. 9, 2009), available at http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/
KlausenStatement.asp.
152 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (Can). The United States has also incorporated such community
standards in its own obscenity standards beginning in the 1950s that seemed to invite moral judgments. See
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (establishing standard of “whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest”). This standard invited a community to cast a judgment whether “material ha[s] a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts.” Id. at 487 n.20.
153 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 476–78.
154 Id. at 478–81 (quoting R. v. Doug Rankine Co., (1983), 9 C.C.C. 3d 53, 70 (Can. Ont. Co. Ct.)).
155 Id. at 481–83.
156 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360.
157 R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 492 (“The obscenity legislation and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of s. 163 were evidently concerned with prohibiting the ‘immoral influences’ of obscene
publications and safeguarding the morals of individuals into whose hands such works could fall. The Hicklin
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prosecute those who transgress majoritarian values, even if they are performing
acts that are entirely consensual. While Sopinka insisted that “[t]o impose a
certain standard of public and sexual morality, solely because it reflects the
conventions of a given community, is inimical to the exercise and enjoyment
of individual freedoms,” he then concluded that the Parliament does have “the
right to legislate on the basis of some fundamental conception of morality for
the purposes of safeguarding the values which are integral to a free and
democratic society.”158 The harm remains in the transgression of social values,
including works viewed as degrading to women or other groups.
The compulsive liberalism scholarship has a disturbing overlap with prior
writers like Lord Devlin and Lord Stephen in seeking to criminalize those who
act in immoral ways in order to protect society. Even words that once
represented freedom are converted to mean freedom from opposing or
oppressive ideas. For example, it is telling that Lord Stephen would adopt the
call of the French Revolution—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—to support the
concept of using state sanctions to force compliance with particular moral
codes or social values.159 It is still a rallying call today, even as the West
curtails free speech and other components of “liberty” as part of a trend of
compulsive liberalism.160 It was ironically the same Robespierrian call161 heard
in Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities in the streets of Paris to vindicate the crimes
committed during the period commonly referred to as “The Terror.”162
III. THE HARM PRINCIPLE APPLIED TO PLURAL UNIONS
The polygamy cases fall on the very fault line between compulsive
liberalism and libertarian theories over the function of criminal sanctions.
Indeed, these cases reveal the striking similarities between the arguments used
against Mill in the nineteenth century and the arguments now advanced by

philosophy posits that explicit sexual depictions, particularly outside the sanctioned contexts of marriage and
procreation, threatened the morals or the fabric of society. In this sense, its dominant, if not exclusive, purpose
was to advance a particular conception of morality. Any deviation from such morality was considered to be
inherently undesirable, independently of any harm to society.” (citations omitted)).
158 Id. at 492–93.
159 STEPHEN, supra note 128, at 163.
160 See Turley, The Threat to French Free Speech, supra note 139.
161 It was Maximilien Robespierre who is credited with the phrase after his 1790 speech On the
Organization of the National Guard. See John A. Lynn, Toward an Army of Honor: The Moral Evolution of
the French Army, 1789–1815, 16 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 152, 155 (1989).
162 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 264 (“Liberty, equality, fraternity, or death;—the last, much the easiest to
bestow, O Guillotine!”).
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twenty-first century scholars and advocates. While figures like Devlin and
Stephen spoke of the need to sanction immoral acts, the social harm today is
more often expressed as fighting the subordination of women or
marginalization of groups to curtail consensual conduct or free speech. This
new compulsive liberalism was evident in the Bountiful case in the
submissions of various experts insisting that plural unions had to remain
criminal to protect women and children. Conversely, the Brown case suggests,
as discussed below, that it is possible to incorporate Millian notions of harm to
protect liberty under modern constitutional analysis. Those different
approaches are explored further below.
A. Harm as a Protection of Public Values
The Bountiful litigation produced a unique mix of expert testimony on the
harms associated with plural unions. Chief Justice Bauman placed that
Loadstone Rock of modern analysis at the heart of his opinion: “I have
concluded that this case is essentially about harm; more specifically,
Parliament’s reasoned apprehension of harm arising out of the practice of
polygamy. This includes harm to women, to children, to society and to the
institution of monogamous marriage.”163 Notably, Chief Justice Bauman
insisted that such harm is secular, even though it includes protecting the
“institution of monogamous marriage.”164
While Chief Justice Bauman struggled to adopt a more modern analysis
than simply upholding the law as combating immorality, he reached a
conclusion very close to that of Devlin when Devlin opposed the
recommendation of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution
163 Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 5 (Can.). The Tenth Circuit has previously stated that the institution
of marriage could be supported as a monogamous tradition under state law: “Monogamy is inextricably woven
into the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon which our culture is built. In light of these fundamental
values, the State is justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its ban on plural marriage to
protect the monogamous marriage relationship.” Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985)
(citation omitted).
164 Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, para. 5. The debate over the exclusivity of “marriage” (particularly in the
same-sex-marriage debate) is heavily laden with morality rationales. I have long been an advocate of the use of
“civil unions” as opposed to “marriage” as the operative term—a license that would be based on the
contractual and legal relationship as opposed to the moral relationship. Jonathan Turley, An Unholy Union:
Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of Governmental Programs to Penalize Religious Groups with Unpopular
Practices, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 59 (Douglas Laycock,
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008); Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., How to End the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, USA TODAY, April 3, 2006, at A15, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/opinion/editorials/2006-04-02-faith-edit_x.htm.
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in the “Wolfenden Report” to decriminalize private sexual relations between
consenting adults.165 While Bauman indicated that he would never support
such a position, his logic that criminal laws can be upheld in defense of the
institution of society was strikingly similar to that of Devlin. Devlin wrote,
The error of jurisprudence in the Wolfenden Report is caused by the
search for some single principle to explain the division between
crime and sin. The Report finds it in the principle that the criminal
law exists for the protection of individuals; on this principle
fornication in private between consenting adults is outside the law
and thus it becomes logically indefensible to bring homosexuality
between consenting adults in private within it. But the true principle
is that the law exists for the protection of society. It does not
discharge its function by protecting the individual from injury,
annoyance, corruption, and exploitation; the law must protect also the
institutions and the community of ideas, political and moral, without
which people cannot live together. Society cannot ignore the morality
of the individual any more than it can his loyalty; it flourishes on
both and without either it dies.166

Like Devlin, Bauman was convinced that plural unions cause harm regardless
of whether particular unions are consensual and reveal no cognizable harm to
the participants. It was the threat of its very existence to the fabric of marriage
as an institution that Bauman saw as a credible basis for criminal sanctions.
While Bauman did not claim that “a change in its morality is tantamount to the
destruction of a society,”167 the import of his ruling was that monogamous
marriage is the foundation for society and that these consensual, plural unions
cannot be tolerated. This is the type of tautological statement that offers little
basis for retort—much, as Hart observed with regard to Devlin, like “Emperor
Justinian’s statement that homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes.”168
Bauman’s sweeping treatment of social harm was supported by two
academics, Marci Hamilton and Rebecca Cook, who testified by affidavit, as I
did, on the basis for criminalizing plural unions.169 Their extensive testimony
165 See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION (Stein & Day 1963) (1957).
166 DEVLIN, supra note 126, at 22 (emphasis added).
167 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 51 (1963) (noting that Devlin would move from the
defensible proposition that “some shared morality is essential to the existence of any society to the
unacceptable proposition that a society is identical with its morality as that is at any given moment of its
history, so that a change in its morality is tantamount to the destruction of a society” (footnote omitted)).
168 Id. at 50.
169 Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588, paras. 256, 798.
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on issues like harm offers a solid foundation to explore the rationale in favor of
criminalization both under U.S. and international law. I will address both
separately, though they have considerable overlap on their treatment of harm
under U.S. and international law, respectively.
1. Professor Marci Hamilton and Harm Under U.S. Law
Professor Hamilton supplied a detailed report to the court on her view that
the criminalization of plural unions under polygamy laws does not contravene
constitutional guarantees in the United States. Professor Hamilton relied
repeatedly on Reynolds v. United States and other eighteenth-century cases.170
The use of these cases is telling given their association with the period of not
just enforced morality codes but open religious prejudice in the courts. To
borrow a quote from A Tale of Two Cities, these cases are “echoes, from a
distance, that rumbled menacingly in the corner all through this space of
time.”171
As noted by Judge Waddoups, the Court’s decision in Reynolds is rife with
open hostility for Mormons and minority groups.172 Professor Hamilton took a
contrary view that while “[s]ome have tried to argue that the federal polygamy
laws[173] were solely a product of animus against the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints[,] . . . that is both an exaggeration and a
mischaracterization.”174 The Brown court’s view, however, is borne out by a
170 98 U.S. 145 (1879). In fairness to Professor Hamilton and others using Reynolds, it has not been
overturned. Indeed, it was cited by Justice Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith in reference to the first time
that the Court upheld the criminalization of polygamy. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“[W]e rejected the claim that
criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the
practice. ‘Laws,’ we said, ‘are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . . Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.’” (omission
in original) (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166–67)).
171 DICKENS, supra note 1, at 205.
172 Indeed, some conservative legal experts have denounced the use of Reynolds as precedent due to its
questionable analysis. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Liberty and Equality Under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1, 2 (criticizing those justices who invoke such antiquated precedent as
Reynolds v. United States).
173 If this is a reference to U.S. precedent, I am unclear what Professor Hamilton is referencing by “federal
polygamy laws” since these laws were state laws. This could be a reference to federal rules barring
polygamous families from admission into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (2012). This is
consistent with the current rule in Canada. See Ali v. Canada (1998), 154 F.T.R. 285.
174 Report: United States History and Constitutional Doctrine Upholding Polygamy Laws Against
Challenges by Religious Entities and Believers at 3, Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588 (No. S-097767), available at
http://infosect.freeshell.org/infocult/Marci_A_Hamilton.pdf [hereinafter Hamilton Report] (citation omitted).
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simple reading of Reynolds, which showed open animus toward this religious
minority as well as other religious and racial minorities. The Court stated, for
example, that “[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church,
was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African
people.”175 This was clearly false and shows a shocking lack of knowledge on
the part of the Court. Indeed, polygamy was widely practiced in North
America and was embraced by not just Mormons but some Protestants and
Jews.176 Nevertheless, Professor Hamilton quoted with approval the Court’s
statement upholding “the universal law” against polygamy: “it is impossible to
believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life.”177
While the First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion while
prohibiting the establishment of religion, Reynolds treated the First
Amendment as limited by the majoritarian hatred of polygamy. Undoubtedly,
there were a plethora of religious practices that the Framers would have found
In addition to Reynolds, Professor Hamilton also quoted, with approval, the Court’s ruling in Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States to show that the Court had rejected the arguments
of this “nefarious” church. Id. at 5. However, the full quote shows the Court, again, expressing open animus
for the Mormons and polygamists from an expressly Christian perspective:
[It] is a matter of public notoriety, that the religious and charitable uses intended to be subserved
and promoted are the inculcation and spread of the doctrines and usages of the Mormon Church,
or Church of Latter-Day Saints, one of the distinguishing features of which is the practice of
polygamy—a crime against the laws, and abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized
world. Notwithstanding the stringent laws which have been passed by Congress—
notwithstanding all the efforts made to suppress this barbarous practice—the sect or community
composing the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints perseveres, in defiance of law, in
preaching, upholding, promoting, and defending it. It is a matter of public notoriety that its
emissaries are engaged in many countries in propagating this nefarious doctrine, and urging its
converts to join the community in Utah. The existence of such a propaganda is a blot on our
civilization. The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a
measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization
which Christianity has produced in the Western world.
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1890).
175 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
176 Expert Report Prepared for the Amicus Curiae by Jonathan Turley paras. 42–99, Bountiful,
2011 BCSC 1588 (No. S-097767), available at https://jonathanturley.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/turleyaffidavit.pdf [hereinafter Turley Report]. Professor Hamilton later made the same factual representation,
stating, “[T[he LDS Church was the only known organization that based its culture on the practice.” Hamilton
Report, supra note 174, at 5. As noted in the text, polygamy was practiced by indigenous peoples and some
European settlers long before the Mormons. It is also worth noting that Professor Hamilton appeared to agree
that, at least with regards to the LDS, polygamy is not simply a religious but a cultural practice, as noted
earlier in this Article.
177 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
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personally “odious.” However, that does not mean that the Constitution must
be assumed to exclude such beliefs from protection in light of their preferences
for “social life.”
Putting aside the flagrant bias expressed by the Court, Reynolds also
foreshadowed the type of harm rationales that would later be used to justify
limiting choice under a compulsive-liberalism approach. What is highly ironic
is that at a time when women were still struggling to obtain basic rights in our
society, the Court condemned plural unions for their dominant male roles. The
Court stressed that “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, . . . which,
when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism,
while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.”178
Consistent with much of the scholarship in this area, the Court used the
extreme form of polygyny to justify state action to combat the harm.179 In the
end, the Reynolds Court asserted that such harms fall squarely within the
power of the government since “it is within the legitimate scope of the power
of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall
be the law of social life under its dominion.”180 Professor Hamilton relied on
this authority despite the fact that this same logic could lead to the
criminalization of all monogamous unions. Indeed, the view in Reynolds was
later repeatedly rejected in Loving v. Virginia when the Court struck down
discriminatory laws against mixed-race couples.181 Anti-miscegenation laws
not only reflected the moral views of the majority; such laws were more
common than the anti-sodomy laws around the country at the time of
Lawrence.182
178

Id. at 166.
See id. Indeed, the Court declared that “from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated
as an offence against society.” Id. at 164.
180 Id. at 166.
181 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Notably, Reynolds was handed down just four years before Pace v. Alabama, where
the Court upheld Alabama’s anti-miscegenation statute (including a majority of Justices who signed on to the
Reynolds decision). 106 U.S. 583 (1883). That decision was later overturned in Loving, in which the Supreme
Court expressly denied the sweeping suggestion that marriage is anything the Reynolds majority says it is:
179

Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of man,” fundamental to our very existence and survival.
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without
due process of law.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (citation omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
182 See J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41, 68 (2011) (“But if we
took the opinion poll/electoral approach to criminalization, then the United States Supreme Court should not
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Reynolds also contains another important element in the modern
scholarship against plural unions, including that of Professor Hamilton. The
Court expressly stated that it does not matter if some or even many plural
unions exist without any of the harms described by the Court. The Court
acknowledged that “[a]n exceptional colony of polygamists under an
exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without appearing to
disturb the social condition of the people who surround it.”183 However, the
Court promptly dismissed that fact because “there cannot be a doubt that,
unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope
of the power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or
monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion.”184
Professor Hamilton reinforced the Reynolds language with an equally
sweeping assertion that refers to polygamy but again appears to be based on
extreme polygyny sects:
The religiously motivated polygamy currently practiced in the
United States and Canada by members of the breakaway
fundamentalist Mormon sects also includes a strong correlation to
child sex abuse, under-age “celestial” bigamist marriages, incest,
statutory rape of both boys and girls, and even permanent expulsion
of unwanted male children, known as “lost boys.”185

However, the evidence offered for this statement is largely anecdotal, citing a
relatively small collection of books focused on particular polygamist groups.186
Professor Hamilton’s report is clearly correct about the occurrence of such
abuses in some plural families. However, even among just polygynous
families, it ignores thousands of such families that have never been the subject
of criminal charges like the Browns.187 There have been a very small number
have stricken down criminal bans on interracial marriage, for at the time of the decision in Loving v. Virginia
70 percent of the public favored such laws, and more states had anti-miscegenation statutes at the time of
Loving than had same-sex sodomy laws at the time of Lawrence.”).
183 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
184 Id.
185 Hamilton Report, supra note 174, at 4 n.7.
186 Id.
187 Once again, there is little question that abuses occurred in compounds of extremist sects like that of
Warren Jeffs. However, scholarship often ignores the families like the Browns that are composed of
consenting adults. Clearly, it is possible to have a plural union without abuses, but you would not know it from
the factual basis for some academic work. Maura Strassberg, for example, also defends criminalization of
polygamy by reference to the most extreme forms of polygyny:
Polygyny was also fundamentally inegalitarian; it was a practice designed to create a
political and religious aristocracy. In a society with relatively equal numbers of men and women,
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of cases of such prosecutions in the history of the United States.188 The books
cited by Professor Hamilton largely come from those cases or advocacy
groups. This type of pseudo-empirical claim would be akin to saying that there
is a strong correlation between the Catholic priesthood and child rape because
of books detailing the small minority of priests found to have been pedophiles.
Likewise, as in Reynolds, there is no consideration given in the Hamilton
Report to the fact that nonreligious polygamy is also criminalized under this
law or that conjugal unions, including those of polyamorists and polyandrists,
are subject to prosecution.
The use of individual cases involving one extreme form of plural unions is
typical of much of the scholarship in this area, as well as the ultimate decision
of Chief Justice Bauman. Professor Hamilton has insisted that “polygamy
rests, inevitably, on child abuse and neglect. The numbers simply cannot
lie.”189 However, this assertion is not based on any concrete numbers for plural
unions as a whole or even data for the narrow category of polygyny that is the
focus of Hamilton’s scholarship.190 Moreover, there is no corresponding
polygyny gives some men significantly greater opportunities to reproduce than others because
many wives for some men means no wives for others. Polygyny thus cannot begin without
significant imbalances in political and economic power between men that can be exercised to
force some men to delay or forego reproduction. Polygynous men, already selected for polygyny
due to their social and economic potential, can further expand their power through control of
greater human resources in the persons of their wives and children. In addition, when polygyny is
a practice limited to those chosen to have religious authority and power in a culture where
religion dominates public life, becoming polygynous opens the doors to the acquisition of even
greater religious, economic and political power.
Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 353, 362 (2003) (footnotes
omitted). For discussion of such harms, see Jason D. Berkowitz, Comment, Beneath the Veil of Mormonism:
Uncovering the Truth About Polygamy in the United States and Canada, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 615,
638–39 (2007); Lauren C. Miele, Note, Big Love or Big Problem: Should Polygamous Relationships Be a
Factor in Determining Child Custody?, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 105, 129–30 (2008); Samantha Slark, Study
Note, Are Anti-Polygamy Laws an Unconstitutional Infringement on the Liberty Interests of Consenting
Adults?, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 451, 455 (2004); Richard A. Vazquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy:
Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 233 (2001).
188 See Polygamy, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/socialvalues/polygamy.shtml
(last updated Oct. 13, 2009) (“There are said to be over 30,000 people practising polygamy in Utah, Idaho,
Montana and Arizona, who either regard themselves as preserving the original Mormon beliefs and customs,
or have merely adopted polygamy as a desired way of life and not as part of the teachings of any church.”).
189 See Marci Hamilton, The Reality of Polygamy: Very Different From What’s Depicted on HBO’s “Big
Love,” FINDLAW (Mar. 23, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20060323.html.
190 Indeed, the harm avoided by the criminalization of plural unions is often confined to the narrowest of
groups in Hamilton’s scholarship, which focuses on the type of extreme compound groups like that of Warren
Jeffs. By focusing on these extreme groups, Hamilton has established the causal connection between
prosecution and risk avoidance. Marci Hamilton, Prosecuting Polygamy in El Dorado, HUFFINGTON POST
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recognition of the even stronger basis to criminalize monogamy under this
same logic. Monogamous families have consistently shown high rates of
spousal and child abuse. In a report to Congress, The Fourth National
Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS–4) found as follows:
Using the stringent Harm Standard definition, more than 1.25 million
children (an estimated 1,256,600 children) experienced maltreatment
during the NIS–4 study year (2005–2006). This corresponds to one
child in every 58 in the United States. A large percentage (44%, or an
estimated total of 553,300) were abused, while most (61%, or an
estimated total of 771,700) were neglected.191

Virtually all of these 1,256,600 children in the last recorded year were abused
or neglected in monogamous families. Yet, those documented rates are never
raised as evidence of the inherently abusive nature of monogamous unions.
Even with millions of children abused in the last ten years in monogamous
families, such rates of criminality would not be a legitimate basis for calling
for a ban on monogamous unions. First, there are no real baseline figures to
understand the percentage of abuse in monogamous families. Second, there is
the danger of a false correlation between the institution and the incidents of
abuse. It remains the classic concern of economics and statistics that
correlation does not mean causation. A study by the United States Department
of Justice found that from 1995 to 1996, “[n]early 25 percent of surveyed
women and 7.6 percent of surveyed men said they were raped and/or
physically assaulted by a current or former spouse, cohabiting partner, or
dat[ing partner/acquaintance] at some time in their lifetime.”192 Just focusing
on assault, approximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are physically
assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the United States.193 Despite the
millions of citizens abused or neglected each year in monogamous families, no
responsible academic would suggest that such criminal and abusive conduct
(May 25, 2011, 12:30 pm EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marci-hamilton/prosecuting-polygamy-ine_b_95674.html (“If authorities (in TX, AZ, NV, and UT) had vigorously enforced the laws against polygamy,
we would not have dangerous cults like the FLDS that are premised on extreme obedience of women and girls
to domineering men and the disposal of teenage boys.”).
191 ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., FOURTH NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
(NIS–4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (2010), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
opre/nis4_report_congress_full_pdf_jan2010.pdf. NIS–4 is a widely cited study by U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Office of Planning, Research,
and Evaluation (OPRE), and the Children’s Bureau.
192 PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN SURVEY, at iii, 1 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf.
193 Id. at 10.
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should be the basis for a ban on monogamous marriage. The validity of
monogamous (and polygamous) marriage should turn on the right of
consenting adults to engage in such unions absent such crimes. Otherwise,
there is little ability to respond, let alone refute, such claims, as protecting the
right to plural unions is synonymous with protecting “the child and spousal
abuse that inevitably follow.”194
Professor Hamilton further argued for the inherent right to criminalize
plural unions as consistent with a state’s inherent power to combat the harm
caused by “licentiousness.” The use of “licentious” highlights the new morality
advanced in these arguments since it is a term defined by Merriam-Webster as
“lacking legal or moral restraints” or “marked by disregard for strict rules of
correctness.”195 Hamilton relied, again, on early court cases that enforced
morality laws. This reliance is a telling example of how new liberalism has
come full circle in citing these once anathema decisions to support a new
normative agenda. These laws ran the full spectrum of morality codes from
criminalizing adultery, fornication, and homosexuality.196 Indeed, under the
logic of Professor Hamilton, society is free to criminalize homosexuality, as
the Court did in Bowers v. Hardwick,197 as licentious and immoral conduct. We
have fortunately rejected that position—as shown in the decision in Lawrence
v. Texas.198 However, Professor Hamilton argued that the state has the inherent
authority to criminalize licentiousness, noting with approval that past cases
have “equated ‘licentiousness’ with a variety of illicit sex activities-adultery,
child sex abuse, and polygamy or bigamy . . . . [and] incest.”199 To support this
194

Hamilton, supra note 190.
Licentious, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
licentious (last visited May 17, 2015).
196 See Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, WASH. POST., Sept. 5, 2004, at B01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62581-2004Sep4.html; Jonathan Turley, The Scarlet Letter
Lives On, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2010, at 09a, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
news/opinion/forum/2010-04-26-column26_ST_N.htm.
197 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (“[R]espondent . . . insists that majority sentiments
about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that
the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis.”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
198 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not
to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
199 Hamilton Report, supra note 174, at 6–7 (citations omitted). What is not mentioned is that it has also
been used to crackdown on “licentious books,” see Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 357–58 (1849);
dismiss rape allegations on the basis of “licentious submissiveness” on the part of the victim, see United States
v. Nicholson, 25 C.M.R. 3, 8 (C.M.A. 1957); prove “licentious and unchaste thoughts,” see People v.
Smittcamp, 161 P.2d 983, 986 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945); charge “licentious language in presence of a
female,” see State v. Coffing, 29 N.E.2d 615, 615 (Ind. App. 1892); and award a new trial on burglary charges
195
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proposition, Professor Hamilton returned to the period during which Devlin
and Stephen wrote their defense of criminalized morality codes—a time when
incredibly abusive acts toward spouses and children were considered legitimate
acts within monogamous unions. Yet, Hamilton argued, in light of these
eighteenth-century cases, that licentiousness can encompass anything that is
deemed “sexual immorality.”200
In fairness to Professor Hamilton, the enforcement of morality standards
continued to be embraced by the Court into the twentieth century. For
example, in Cleveland v. United States, the Court wrote that “[t]he
establishment or maintenance of polygamous households is a notorious
example of promiscuity. The permanent advertisement of their existence is an
example of the sharp repercussions which they have in the community.”201
This was precisely the type of argument rejected in the due process context in
Lawrence v. Texas:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers
was making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. . . . For
many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they
aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These
considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The
issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to
enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.”202

The “moral code” referenced by the Court is now more often expressed as
“social harm,” though Hamilton is more honest in acknowledging that she
believes consensual relations can be regulated in the same way as

because the witness was “a licentious, dissolute woman. . . . [with] lewd and lascivious habits and character,”
see Robinson v. State, 53 Md. 151, 154 (1880); as well as a host of other acts or attributes.
200 Hamilton Report, supra note 174, at 7. The heavy reliance on such eighteenth-century cases and more
ignores the fact that constitutional terms tend to evolve with society. In the U.S. Constitution, for example,
what constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment is gradually changing with
society. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court recognized that “the words of the
Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)
(footnote omitted) (discussing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)). Privacy interpretations have
shown a similar expansion with society.
201 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946).
202 539 U.S at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
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“licentiousness.” Certainly, if one accepts that moral judgments like
licentiousness are cognizable harm, there are few limits on the majority in
dictating the private relations of adults and families. The fact is that adultery
and fornication statutes (once defended as punishing licentious and immoral
conduct) are presumptively unconstitutional and rarely enforced. Indeed, as
noted above, Professor Hamilton’s historical and legal analysis would suggest
that states could criminalize homosexuality—which like polygamy has been
historically treated as a crime and a “nefarious” practice. The same Justices
who handed down Reynolds and Pace articulated this view most strongly in
Davis v. Beason.203 Again, it is worth fully quoting this Court, which embraced
the standard of licentiousness. As in the prior rulings, the Court emphasized
the fact that Mormon practices of polygamy do not comport with its own
Christian values and noted that it would no sooner decriminalize adultery
(which is now, of course, effectively decriminalized):
However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate
to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions
regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive
legislation. There have been sects which denied as a part of their
religious tenets that there should be any marriage tie, and advocated
promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by the passions of
its members. And history discloses the fact that the necessity of
human sacrifices, on special occasions, has been a tenet of many
sects. Should a sect of either of these kinds ever find its way into this
country, swift punishment would follow the carrying into effect of its
doctrines, and no heed would be given to the pretense that, as
religious beliefs, their supporters could be protected in their exercise
by the Constitution of the United States. Probably never before in the
history of this country has it been seriously contended that the whole
punitive power of the government for acts, recognized by the general
consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper matters for
prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a
religious sect encouraging crime may be carried out without
hindrance.204

The Court in Davis made no pretense of its insistence on upholding Christian
values against a hated “sect” and further equated both adultery and polygamy
with human sacrifice as part of its licentiousness inquiry.205 The line between

203
204
205

133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Id. at 342–43.
Id. at 343.
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majoritarian morality code and social harm disappears in such logic as it does
in the scholarship of Professor Hamilton and others.
2. The Cook Testimony and Harm Under International Law
Professor Rebecca Cook’s testimony in Bountiful reflected the same
translation of moral or normative values into claims of social harm.206 Cook
argued that Canada is obligated to ban forms of polygamy. Cook dismissed
arguments, including those of this author, that international principles support
the decriminalization of such consensual arrangements that are based on
religious, cultural, and personal values.207 For example, Article 17 of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expressly
protects the right of privacy and specifically condemns arbitrary laws that
invade the homes of citizens:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.208

Cook dismissed such principles in the context of plural unions,209 even though
they have been extended to protect homosexual unions.210 Various
international sources protect private decisions relating to sexual relationships
and family.211
206 Expert Report Prepared for the Attorney General of Canada Regarding: “State Obligations to
Eliminate Polygamy Under International Law” by Rebecca J. Cook, Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588 (Can.) (No.
S-097767) [hereinafter Cook Report] (on file with the Emory Law Journal).
207 Id.
208 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see also European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 (entered
into force Aug. 11, 1955).
209 Cook Report, supra note 206, paras. 198–199.
210 For example, in 1994, the Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, found a Tasmanian criminal provision on homosexuality to be a violation of
Articles 2(1) and 17 of the Covenant. See Toonen v. Australia, Human Rights Comm., Comm. No. 488/1992,
at 133, 134, 140, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994).
211 For example, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (formally the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) mandates that “[e]veryone has
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 208, art. 8; see also Kokkinakis v.
Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8, 11, 17 (1993), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-57827 (reviewing criminal laws that undermine free exercise).
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To overcome such pluralistic principles, Cook (like Hamilton) turned to the
eighteenth century as affirming the right of states to punish consenting adults
for their private relations. Also, like Hamilton, Cook used the most extreme
form of polygyny as a focus of her analysis rather than address the broad array
of plural relationships. This is done despite the fact that the law extends to
conjugal unions and most certainly includes plural relationships such as
polyandry. The harm identified by Professor Cook is likewise based on how
this narrowly defined group of polygynists presents a danger to the rights of
women. She insisted that the “inherent wrongs” of polygyny motivating
criminalization include opposition to “patriarchal structuring” of family life.212
Such structuring might, in Professor Cook’s view, “offend[] women’s
dignity,”213 even though it is a common structuring in North America and
around the world in traditional families. Professor Cook also qualified any
obligation stated under these international sources, arguing that “states might
well be obligated to use the criminal law as an appropriate measure to
eliminate [polygyny].”214 Once again, this does not suggest any equal
obligation to eliminate polyandry or polyamory. Moreover, it does not state a
clear obligation, even in cases of polygyny, or the threshold showing of harm
needed to justify such a law.215 Since most plural unions in the United States
and Canada are formed by consensual decisions of women, it is not clear
whether their consent matters if the very existence of a plural relationship is
deemed an “offense to women’s dignity.”216 It is clear that these women are

212

Cook Report, supra note 206, para. 16.
Id.
214 Id. para. 18 (emphasis added).
215 Cf. Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law,
21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 213, 250 (2003) (“Where states allow polygamy but not polyandry (as per Islamic
law), they violate the basic principle against sex discrimination contained in Article 16(1) of CEDAW.”).
216 Professor Cook relied on such sources as a General Comment to the Equality of Rights Between Men
and Women and a Recommendation from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women Committee on Equality of Marriage and Family Relations concerning the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). But see Dina Bogecho, Putting It To
Good Use: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Women’s Right to Reproductive
Health, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 229, 265 (2004) (“[G]eneral comments and recommendations
are not legally binding . . . .”); Yakaré-Oulé Jansen, The Right to Freely Have Sex? Beyond Biology:
Reproductive Rights and Sexual Self-Determination, 40 AKRON L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2007) (“As the
committees are not judicial bodies and therefore cannot issue binding decisions, the recommendations are, at
most, an authoritative interpretation of the rights embodied in the treaties.” (footnote omitted)). I agree with
Professor Cook’s interpretation of Comment 14, which describes the disapproval expressed for polygamy in
these sources, a view shared by other academics. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify
the Women’s Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 273 (2002) (“[F]or example, the
practice of polygamy is inconsistent with the CEDAW because it undermines women’s equality with men and
213
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simply viewed as making bad choices; regardless of their consent or ability to
leave, the relationship is viewed as inherently and presumptively harmful.
Professor Cook’s notion of social harm is evident in her testimony that
plural unions, under the criminal code, prevent a woman from being
“subsumed within her husband’s legal personality.”217 It is unclear not only
how to define the harm but also how to shape the solution if the criminal code
is to be used to fight against “[s]tereotypes of feminine dependence, fragility,
and commercial naivety” and counter “stereotypes of masculine protective
breadwinning and financial acumen.”218 Various aspects of monogamy, from
treating marriage couples as a single entity for purposes of legal privilege to
the adoption of a man’s surname in marriage, could be viewed as subsuming
potentially fosters severe financial inequities.”). However, such sources do not require the court to continue to
allow the criminalization of consensual relations of Canadians in their private lives. See Linda M. Keller, The
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Evolution and (Non)implementation
Worldwide, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 35, 37 (2004) (“Article 18 specifically notes that states can indicate
‘factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfillment of obligations’—implying that compliance is not
really expected. When states’ reports are considered, the Committee can merely offer suggestions and general
recommendations.”); cf. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong,
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 169–70 (2006) (noting the United States did not ratify CEDAW and “[i]t
is debatable whether formal treaty obligations commit the United States to a policy of prohibiting polygamy as
part of the international effort against inequality”). Moreover, Cook’s reliance on Comment 14 of the General
Recommendation No. 21 from the CEDAW Committee on Equality of Marriage and Family Relations, see,
e.g., Cook Report, supra note 206, paras. 189–190, ignores the countervailing principle contained in
Comment 16: “[a] woman’s right to choose a spouse and enter freely into marriage is central to her life and to
her dignity and equality as a human being.” This includes the “same right freely to choose a spouse and to
enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.” Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Rep. on its 13th Sess., Jan. 17–Feb. 4, 1994, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/49/38; GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No.
38 (Apr. 12, 1994), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/49/plenary/a49-38.htm. If Canada were
to decriminalize consensual plural unions (while continuing to prosecute coerced or abusive relationships),
women would be guaranteed the same rights as called for under Comment 16.
217 Cook Report, supra note 206, para. 27.
218 Id. The Human Rights Commission did condemn polygamy in General Comment No. 28 on Equality
of Rights between Men and Women in a brief and highly generalized statement: “It should also be noted that
equality of treatment with regard to the right to marry implies that polygamy is incompatible with the
principle. Polygamy violates the dignity of women. It is an inadmissible discrimination against women.
Consequently, it should be definitely abolished wherever it continues to exist.” Human Rights Comm., CCPR
General Comment No. 28, Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), 68th Sess., Mar. 29,
2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, para. 24 (2000), available at http://www.refworld.org/
docid/45139c9b4.html. One must first note that General Comment No. 28 uses the general reference of
polygamy as opposed to polygyny. It is unclear if the authors meant to include polyandry, for example, as
violating the dignity of women or more generally polyamory. It would be inconceivable that such a
generalized and brief statement would be treated as requiring states to criminalize polygamy, particularly given
the fact that polygamy is widely and openly practiced in many states. Second, the affirmative statement that a
practice should be “abolished” does not necessarily mean polygamists should be prosecuted. A state can
officially oppose polygamy while recognizing that it is a practice that can be consensually entered into by
adults as a matter of free will.
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women. Moreover, while Professor Cook stated that “[n]ormative systems that
permit polygyny continue to rely on sex as a central axis in the distribution of
marital rights and obligations,”219 the same criticism can be levied against
polyamorous, polyandrous, and some monogamous unions. Many traditional
monogamous families treat women on some level as “procreators” and deny
women choice in “determin[ing] the number and spacing of children.”220
Indeed, traditional Catholic families often follow the Church’s admonitions
against contraception—as do other faiths. While Cook warned of “the
centrality of motherhood (thereby creating fatherhood) [that] is evident in
some of the religious and customary norms governing marriage among Islamic
and African communities,”221 many monogamous unions are clearly based on
the same “centrality of motherhood” despite following other religions.
In the end, Professor Cook was willing to concede that “[i]n some contexts,
polygyny can undoubtedly serve a beneficial function for some women and
children” and “the degree to which individual experiences of plural families
can differ.”222 This is precisely the issue raised with regard to Professor
Hamilton’s testimony: whether the court should ignore the fact that it is
possible to have plural unions that are not harmful or otherwise abusive. I
believe that must be the starting point of any analysis. We do not define free
speech rights, for example, by focusing on the use of speech to commit crimes.
Rather, we recognize that free speech can be used in unpopular but harmless
ways. Otherwise, we could ban monogamous marriages based on the fact that
millions of such unions produce spousal or child abuse every year in North
America.
There are a great variety of plural unions in North America, and Cook
acknowledged “[e]merging ethnographic work in Bountiful, British Columbia,
suggest[ing] that collaboration is common among co-wives, though feelings of
competition and jealousy are also present.”223 Indeed, as noted by Professor
Shayna Sigma,
[a]bsent any other harms, it is unclear why adult women should not
be [allowed to enter into a plural marriage], provided they are
well-informed about the decision, offered the opportunity to choose
219

Cook Report, supra note 206, para. 29.
Id. para. 33.
221 Id. para. 34.
222 Id. paras. 39–40. Indeed, she noted later that “commentators argue that in certain circumstances,
polygyny may increase family wealth.” Id. para. 57.
223 Id. para. 45.
220
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alternatives, and provided an opportunity to leave polygamy if they
so desire. . . .
....
. . . [T]here is no evidence that polygamy per se creates abuse or
neglect. Having sister wives can be a support network. The status of
senior wives versus junior wives and the relationships among these
women vary between cultures. In fact, by banding together, women
sometimes wield more power to change their husband’s problematic
behavior.224

The fact that these unions can be viewed so differently exposes the subjectivity
of the social harm used to support criminal sanctions. There is a danger, as
with same-sex marriage controversies, in “the use of relationships as a legal
proxy for societal evils, as it leads to unmerited persecution and perpetuates
prejudice.”225 Indeed, the success of the television program Sister Wives is in
part due to the revelation for many viewers that a polygamous family can have
strong if not dominant women. The Brown women include “sister wives” who
were either raised in monogamous families or actually came from prior
monogamous marriages. As noted earlier, they believe in the legal right of
divorce and have utilized divorce options in the past, including a recent divorce
from Kody Brown.226 Their children are given the full choice not to adopt a
polygamous lifestyle for themselves. In fact, some of the older children have
indicated that they want a monogamous marriage for themselves, while others
indicate that they would prefer a polygamous marriage. Moreover, the majority
of Brown women work and pool their wealth and resources—a relationship
that they value over a monogamous union or living as a single mother.
In both the Brown and Bountiful cases, laws were defended by generalized
arguments often citing the insularity and unpopularity of polygamists,
particularly when highlighting cases involving compound polygamous
communities like that of Warren Jeffs. While it is true that there have been
isolated and closed compounds of polygynists, it also appears true that the
criminalization of polygamy is a contributor to such isolation.227 It is rather
circular to cite the insularity of such families as the basis for criminalization
224

Sigman, supra note 216, at 172–73 (footnote omitted).
Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy And Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the Same-Sex
Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 599 (2008).
226 See supra note 69.
227 That obviously does not include such cases as Warren Jeffs, who was hiding rape, child abuse, and
other criminal acts.
225

TURLEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

5/27/2015 2:10 PM

THE LOADSTONE ROCK

1959

when the criminalization compels insularity.228 However, many families like
the Brown family in Utah are not insulated. The adults work outside of the
community of polygamists and have monogamous coworkers and friends.
The reliance of Professor Cook (as with Professor Hamilton) on Reynolds
v. United States229 captured the true content of the social harm connected to
plural unions. Beneath Cook’s insistence that Canada is obligated to take “all
appropriate measures” to eliminate polygyny is a moral judgment as to the
correctness of these plural relationships.230 If the harm were composed of
“prejudices and practices that are based upon the inferiority of women and on
their stereotyped roles,”231 a great variety of religious and social practices
would appear to warrant (if not demand) criminal sanctions, from the
criminalization of pornography to the restriction of magazines like Playboy.232
To use general principles against any norms and practices that support or
encourage “discrimination against women” is to allow the criminalization of
centuries of human institutions and norms.233 There are a great variety of
228 This type of circular logic was evident in State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004), where the Utah
Supreme Court noted not only that were abuses common in polygamous families but also that “the closed
nature of polygamous communities makes obtaining evidence of and prosecuting these crimes challenging.”
Id. at 830. The court seems oblivious to fact that those efforts to prosecute are an obvious motivation to close
families off from society and try to hide any indication of a plural family.
229 Cook Report, supra note 206, para. 101.
230 Id. paras. 18–19, 119, 134.
231 Id. para. 136.
232 Related arguments have uniformly failed in the United States, where courts allow consenting adults to
buy pornography and engage in stereotyping of women. See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down an Indianapolis Ordinance banning pornography as a form of
discrimination against women and noting that “[t]he Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective
right and silence opponents”).
233 It is equally unsupportable, in my view, to cite as authority a CEDAW Concluding Observation as
compelling criminalization of polygamy. Cook Report, supra note 206, para. 171. There is a great difference
between a stated concern and an international obligation. The Concluding Observation was expressed as a
concern over

the prevalence of a patriarchal ideology in the State party with firmly entrenched stereotypes and
the persistence of deep-rooted adverse cultural norms, customs and traditions, including forced
and early marriage, polygamy . . . that discriminate against women, result in limitations to
women’s educational and employment opportunities and constitute serious obstacles to women’s
enjoyment of their human rights.
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Timor-Leste, 44th Sess., July 20–Aug. 7, 2009, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/TLS/CO/1, para. 27 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW.C.TLS.CO.1.pdf. Many of us would agree with this list of offensive practices, but
part of a woman’s enjoyment of her human rights is to be able to make a choice, including a choice between a
singular or plural relationship. It would be a dangerous practice to use a general principle to convert
nondiscriminatory principles into criminal prohibitions.

TURLEY GALLEYSPROOFS2

1960

5/27/2015 2:10 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1905

matters that could be viewed as “customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women.”234 This, according to Professor Cook, includes
traditions and views that “essentialize women’s reproductive capacity.”235
From arranged marriages to dowry systems, such an approach would obligate
states to criminalize large segments of their societies.
B. Harm As a Limiting Principle To Protect Individual Choice
The expert testimony in Bountiful captures vividly the broadening of social
harm to encompass consensual conduct viewed inimical to social values and
mores. It also reveals an outcome-determinative structure to the analysis that
excludes alternative perspectives on the meaning of morality or consent in
family structures. As shown below, this methodological bias can be traced
from some of the original polygamy cases to more recent cases. However,
there are also emerging cases that seek a more neutral analytical approach and
notably a narrower definition of social harm in the review of criminal sanctions
for consensual conduct.
While Professors Hamilton and Cook offered impressive and
well-researched positions in the Bountiful litigation, they (like the Court)
tended to exclude any recognition of alternative views of morality or equality
from the perspective of plural families. There is an inherent false dichotomy
here: monogamy as moral and polygamy as immoral or, alternatively,
monogamy as consensual and polygamy as coercive. In the discussion of the
majoritarian tradition of monogamy as an institution, there is little effort to
explore polygamy as a moral lifestyle. Judge Walker raised an analogous
question in his historic decision striking down the California bar on same-sex
marriage. As critics of the ban on same-sex marriage have noted, morality
advocates uniformly fail “to address arguments about the morality of same-sex
sexual acts and the moral character of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.”236 It
is often the signature of such analysis that the morality of the majoritarian
position is well articulated while the alleged immorality of the minority
position is left as facially obvious. Hart captured the inherent danger of such
analysis, saying that “[t]he greatest of the dangers . . . was not that in fact the
majority might use their power to oppress a minority, but that, with the spread
of democratic ideas, it might come to be thought unobjectionable that they
234

Id. para. 163 (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. para. 167.
236 Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 471, 503–04 (2001).
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should do so.”237 Hart’s point is that majoritarian presumptions of harm could
become a new “truth” that shapes opinions—both for individuals and courts.
The presumption of harm was evident in the second recorded polygamy
prosecution in Utah. In that case, it was the Black rather than the Brown
family, but the basis for the claims of criminality was strikingly similar. In re
Black involved the children of Vera and Leonard Black, a polygamous
Mormon couple living along the border of Utah and Arizona.238 While the
Blacks lived in the Utah section of Short Creek, the Governor of Arizona had
arranged a massive raid on their town to rescue the women and children of the
fundamentalist Mormon families.239 Vera was the second of Leonard’s three
wives, and their marriage was purely spiritual without multiple marriage
licenses. The public authorities in Utah filed a neglect petition against the
Blacks after the raid. However, despite a full trial, the state failed to convince a
court that the Blacks’ children were inadequately clothed and fed.
Nevertheless, the judge found the children legally neglected and ordered their
removal on the grounds that the parents persistently violated the law
prohibiting polygamy.240 The disconnect between the evidence of harm and the
conviction was captured in two findings:
16. That there was no evidence that any of the children were destitute
and without proper sustenance, clothing or medical care.
17. That the home of Leonard Black and Vera Johnson Black at Short
Creek, Utah, is an immoral environment for the rearing of said
children.241

The court held that the children were abused because the family structure
was deemed immoral and thus by definition harmful.242 The court quoted the
Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Beason at length to drive home that
immoral acts are by definition harmful acts. Indeed, the quotation from Davis
includes not just an analogy of plural unions to human sacrifice but also (as in
Reynolds) an amplification of the law as a reflection of true Christian morality:

237

HART, supra note 167, at 77–78.
283 P.2d 887 (Utah 1955).
239 Id. at 888.
240 Id. at 891.
241 Id.
242 The decision included such curious findings as “Mr. Black gave strange testimony and such as a
monogamous husband would not likely give. He testified that he doesn’t remember when he married any of his
3 wives.” Id. at 896.
238
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Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and
Christian countries. They are crimes by the laws of the United States,
and they are crimes by the laws of Idaho. They tend to destroy the
purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to
degrade woman, and to debase man. Few crimes are more pernicious
to the best interests of society, and receive more general or more
deserved punishment. To extend exemption from punishment for
such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the community.
To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common
sense of mankind. If they are crimes, then to teach, advise, and
counsel their practice is to aid in their commission, and such
teaching and counseling are themselves criminal, and proper
subjects of punishment, as aiding and abetting crime are in all other
cases. . . . It was never intended or supposed that the [first]
amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation for
the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals
of society. . . . Probably never before in the history of this country has
it been seriously contended that the whole punitive power of the
government for acts, recognized by the general consent of the
Christian world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory
legislation, must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious
sect encouraging crime may be carried out without hindrance.243

In 1955, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the removal of the Black
family children.244 It has remained on the books like Reynolds and Davis,
despite the openly biased and hostile sentiments of the language. Moreover,
today, citizens are entirely protected in living their lives in open denial of the
idea that “there should be any marriage tie” and in advocating “promiscuous

243 Id. at 903–05 (quoting Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–43 (1890)). The Davis Court continued its
dismissal of religious freedom claims from a faith that it called a “cultus” practice. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342.
Despite the fact that the practice was that of consenting adults and was ancient in origin, the Court scoffed at
such minority religious views as akin to human sacrifice:

There have been sects which denied as a part of their religious tenets that there should be any
marriage tie, and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by the passions of
its members. And history discloses the fact that the necessity of human sacrifices, on special
occasions, has been a tenet of many sects. Should a sect of either of these kinds ever find its way
into this country, swift punishment would follow the carrying into effect of its doctrines, and no
heed would be given to the pretence that, as religious beliefs, their supporters could be protected
in their exercise by the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 343.
244 In re Black, 283 P.2d at 891–92.
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intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by the passions of its members.”245 The
concept of presumptive harm from immoral acts is no longer considered within
the realm of legitimate rationales. However, listed by this same court, the other
values of combating the degradation of women and promiscuity (though
Professor Hamilton uses “licentiousness”) are still advanced as facially valid
types of social harm.
The signature of these early cases is the threshold assumption that
monogamy is the natural form of marital unions and that departure from that
tradition is presumptively harmful. That same bias was evident in cases like
Potter v. Murray City, where the Tenth Circuit declared in 1985 that
“[m]onogamy is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society. It is the
bedrock upon which our culture is built. In light of these fundamental values,
the State is justified, by a compelling interest, in upholding and enforcing its
ban on plural marriage to protect the monogamous marriage relationship.”246
The court laid bare the outcome-determinative logic of these cases. “Society”
(by which it is referring simply to the majority) has selected monogamy as
fitting its “fundamental values” and serving as the bedrock for its concept of a
correct family.247
The foundation for a more Millian definition of harm has already been laid
in cases outside of polygamy challenges. In constitutional cases involving such
questions as same-sex marriage, generalized conclusions are no longer
245 Id. at 904 (quoting Davis, 133 U.S. at 343). Notably, this same line appears in 1890 in Davis v.
Beason. The passage reveals the same Devlin logic discussed above in the imposition of a moral code in
curtailment of free exercise:

However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country, passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of
punitive legislation. There have been sects which denied as a part of their religious tenets that
there should be any marriage tie, and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the sexes as
prompted by the passions of its members. And history discloses the fact that the necessity of
human sacrifices, on special occasions, has been a tenet of many sects. Should a sect of either of
these kinds ever find its way into this country, swift punishment would follow the carrying into
effect of its doctrines, and no heed would be given to the pretence that, as religious beliefs, their
supporters could be protected in their exercise by the Constitution of the United States.
Davis, 133 U.S. at 342–43. The same line was quoted as late as 1922 in McMasters v. State, 207 P. 566, 568
(Okla. Crim. App. 1922).
246 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
247 Id.; see also State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006) (“[M]arital relationships serve as the
building blocks of our society. The State must be able to assert some level of control over those relationships
to ensure the smooth operation of laws and further the proliferation of social unions our society deems
beneficial while discouraging those deemed harmful. The people of this State have declared monogamy a
beneficial marital form and have also declared polygamous relationships harmful.”).
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considered a viable showing of harm, as evidenced in recent rulings striking
down state prohibitions.248 Some of the same arguments, including the harm to
children being raised by same-sex parents, were routinely rejected as
unsupported and unsupportable.249 They failed to support the criminalization of
homosexual relations. This same lack of a nexus was identified in the Brown
case where the state “provided academic discussion about ‘social harms’
arising from religious cohabitation” that Judge Waddoups rejected as facially
inadequate to support criminalization of a consensual union.250 The State could
offer little more than the Supreme Court offered in Reynolds when it simply
dismissed polygamy as an “odious” social harm.251
The Brown court explored “social harm” and correctly identified the claim
of the state as basically a refashioning of the moral condemnation of the
Reynolds Court. Judge Waddoups noted that the Court was clear that the real
“social harm” was the view that the “Mormons were degrading the morals of
the country through their religious practices, such as polygamy, which, the
Supreme Court declared, constituted ‘a return to barbarism’ and were ‘contrary
to the spirit of Christianity.’”252 It was not enough to cite academic works that
argue that “polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle”—a claim fraught with
subjectivity.253
248

See supra note 18.
See, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir.) (“Because the Proponents’ arguments are
based on overbroad generalizations about same-sex parents, and because there is no link between banning
same-sex marriage and promoting optimal childrearing, this aim cannot support the Virginia Marriage
Laws.”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 653 (W.D. Tex. 2014)
(“Defendants have not provided any evidentiary support for their assertion that denying marriage to same-sex
couples positively affects childrearing.”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1214 (D. Utah 2013)
(“[T]he State has not shown any effect of the availability of same-sex marriage on the number of children
raised by either opposite-sex or same-sex partners.”), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
265 (2014).
250 Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (D. Utah 2013).
251 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879); see also Orma Linford, The Mormons and the
Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REV. 308, 341 (1964) (discussing lack of definition of social harm in
Reynolds); Todd M. Gillett, Note, The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality of Religious Polygamy,
8 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 513 (2000) (same).
252 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890)).
253 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. Former Utah Chief Justice Durham also exposed the weak evidentiary
foundation for claims of social harm in Green. In State v. Holm, she noted that the majority
249

was content to rely on assertions in a student law review piece that polygamy was frequently
related to other criminal conduct, together with two local cases, including the case of Green
himself. However, reviewing this assessment in light of the heightened scrutiny I believe is called
for here, I cannot conclude that the restriction that the bigamy law places on the religious
freedom of all those who, for religious reasons, live with more than one woman is necessary to
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Mill’s Harm Principle represents a bright-line rule against the inclusion of
moral or majoritarian values as the basis for social harm.254 The role of harm is
to limit the range of legitimate regulation of individual choices and relations.
This applies with equal force to dictating (on the pain of prosecution) “correct”
choices for women to make so as not to be degraded or marginalized. To return
to Mill:
His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant. He
cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in
the opinions of others, to do would be wise, or even right. These are
good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or
visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to
produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence
is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign. . . .
....
But there is a sphere of action in which society as distinguished
from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest;
comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which
affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free,
voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation. . . . This, then,
is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the
inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in
the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling;
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical
or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. . . . Secondly, the
further the state’s interest in this regard. Upon closer review, the student Note is unconvincing.
The State has provided no evidence of a causal relationship or even a strong correlation between
the practice of polygamy whether religiously motivated or not, and the offenses of “incest, sexual
assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child support.” Moreover, even assuming such a
correlation did exist, neither the record nor the recent history of prosecutions of alleged
polygamists warrants the conclusion that [the Statute] is a necessary tool for the state’s attacks of
such harms.
State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 774 (Utah 2006) (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
254 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 240–58 (1977); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 173–75 (1988); HART, supra note 167, at 77–78;
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 165–66 (1991).
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principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of
our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such
consequences as may follow: without impediment from our
fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.
Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty,
within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to
unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons
combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or
deceived.255

Mill’s words seem particularly prophetic in the context of the Bountiful
case. His view of harm limiting government power fits perfectly with a
pluralistic society based on notions of tolerance and liberty. However, since the
1960s, emerging movements to protect different groups led to an expansion of
the view of social harm.256 As these collective notions of social interest and
social harm increased, there was a move away from the individualized notions
of rights and harm contained in the writings of Mill and others. For Mill, the
harm principle guaranteed maximum freedom and choice—the realization of
self-expression of “man as a progressive being.”257
That view has deeper resonance today with modern constitutional
analysis.258 Cases related to privacy and equal protection often speak in terms
255
256

MILL, supra note 15, at 23, 27–28.
Professor Harcourt observed:
Looking at the historical shifts in the debate through the lens of legal semiotics, however,
offers an important insight: the ideological shift of the harm principle over the past twenty years
reflects a natural tilt in the original, simple harm principle—a natural tilt that favors a finding of
harm. By returning to the original, simple statement of the harm principle in the 1960s, the
progressives opened the door to the proliferation of harm arguments and brought about the
collapse of the harm principle.

Harcourt, supra note 121, at 186.
257 MILL, supra note 15, at 25.
258 The Court’s recent decision in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015), offers an interesting variation in
dealing religious rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012)). In that case, the
state offered generalized notions of harm posed by a prisoner wearing a beard in observation of his Muslim
faith. The Court voted 9–0 that such statements of harm must offer a concrete nexus between the specific
conduct and the concrete harm stated by the prison. RLUIPA was passed after its sister law, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(invalidating the applicability of the Act to the States and States’ subdivisions). RFRA was passed “in order to
provide very broad protection for religious liberty.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2760 (2014). RFRA followed the ruling in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), undermining
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strikingly similar to those used by Mill and Bentham. These rights are viewed
as instrumental in persons establishing the personal relations and fulfillment
that they seek in their private lives and families. For example, when the Court
has discussed the institution of marriage, it has emphasized how marriage is
tied to a deep individual right of intimacy and family relations. This discussion
is not limited to the institution itself but also extends to the protection of the
right of individuals to enjoy the conditions of marriage. Thus, in 1967, the
freedom to marry people of another race was linked to “one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”259
The intimate or familial relationships of adults are at the center of the
associational rights protected by the Constitution.260 The Lawrence decision
contains some of the strongest language separating harm from morality—
reinforcing the nexus between privacy interests and individual choice:
The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions
of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to
which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives.
These considerations do not answer the question before us, however.
The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to

claims over incidental burdens of free exercise under generally applicable laws. Applying the statutory
standard, the Court rejected claims of harm to security in having short beards in the type of analysis that placed
the burden on the government. However, this more Millian notion of harm is found in the statutory language.
259 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977) (recognizing a fundamental interest in familial organization in the home); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965) (recognizing a fundamental right of marital privacy over questions of
procreation).
260 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984) (explaining that a unifying principle of its prior
cases is the degree of intimacy between the adults in a relationship or group: “they are distinguished by such
attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation,
and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship”). Nor does this protected relationship exist
solely in cases of blood relation and legal marriage. See, e.g., Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844–46 (1977) (concluding that foster children have an intimate relationship with their
foster parents and balancing that liberty interest with the state’s role in creating the relationship); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending Griswold’s protected liberty interest in contraception to unmarried
individuals). The Supreme Court’s holding in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) is not
contrary to this principle. Boraas concerned the state’s authority to limit cohabitation of multiple unrelated
people in the context of zoning; the case does not establish the state’s power to criminalize unmarried
cohabitation across the entirety of its jurisdiction, which is one of the precise consequences of the Utah statute
in this case.
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enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the
criminal law.261

While child or spousal abuse is obviously a cognizable harm (and a compelling
basis for a law when a close nexus is established), protecting the institution of
marriage, as defined by majoritarian morality, is not tied to a Millian harm that
would make it a compelling or rational basis for criminalization.262 The
purpose of the Utah statute was originally stated to be, and publicly defended
as, strictly moral and religious—it criminalizes polygamy because society
considers it immoral.263 As the Court noted in Lawrence, “the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.”264
Under Lawrence, “moral opposition” is an invalid interest even under
rational basis review. Lawrence is applicable to intimate adult sexual behavior
that is private and noncommercial in nature; the application of a demanding
rational basis analysis is triggered by the state’s encroachment into activity that
is closely linked to familial organizations and romantic relationships. Indeed,
the earlier case set aside by Lawrence offered the very rationales advanced by
scholars in support of criminalized morality codes. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the
261 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003). As such, the decision can be viewed as based on the
harm principle. See Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Mill, and Same-Sex Relationships: On Values, Valuing, and the
Constitution, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 285, 291 n.37 (2006).
262 Indeed, the same conclusory basis is evident in the analysis regarding any legitimate governmental
purpose under intermediate scrutiny. Once again, such analysis circles back to simply majoritarian bias or
values. That was evident in Justice Alito’s dissent in Windsor. While Alito took the Justice Department to task
for “really seeking to have the Court resolve a debate between two competing views of marriage,” his solution
was to treat the division of values and religious beliefs as its own self-affirming justification. United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). There was a similar division of opinion on
interracial marriage. Alito’s dissent would have been equally applicable in Loving.
263 Moral disapproval is obvious in the Supreme Court’s prior rulings on anti-polygamy laws. See
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (“The establishment or maintenance of polygamous
households is a notorious example of promiscuity.”). To the extent Cleveland did rely on moral justifications,
Lawrence and other more recent cases have overruled it.
264 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). Notably, even were moral disapproval of sexual promiscuity accepted as a legitimate government
interest, the anti-bigamy statute at issue here addresses that interest differently for married and unmarried
persons and thus falls squarely into the holding of Eisenstadt v. Baird, where the Court struck down a
Massachusetts law that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to unmarried couples. 405 U.S. at 444. Declining
to reach the issue of whether the law infringed on a fundamental right and thus required strict scrutiny,
id. at 447 n.7, the Court applied rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause and found that there was no
“ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment accorded married and unmarried
persons.” Id. at 447. “[W]hatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be,” the Court
held, “the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.” Id. at 453.
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Court upheld by a 5-to-4 vote Georgia’s anti-sodomy statute as an exercise of
the fundamental right of states to declare what is “immoral and
unacceptable.”265 In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger laid bare the
religious foundations for such laws and said that Georgia was merely
advancing “Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards” governing society as
shown by a “millennia of moral teaching.”266 Lawrence not only overturned
that decision but its underlying notion of social harm.
This view of criminal codes reinforcing morality codes continued long after
Hardwick. In the Holm decision, the Utah Supreme Court’s explanation of the
protection-of-marriage interest focused on the state’s participation in legal
marriages and the legislature’s preference for monogamy for creating “the
building blocks of our society.”267 In essence, the court concluded that “the
public nature of polygamists’ attempts to extralegally redefine the acceptable
parameters of a fundamental social institution like marriage” distinguished the
statute from the law at issue in Lawrence.268 However, plural religious
marriage is, itself, a purely private living arrangement, centered around the
home. Indeed, plural unions tend to be more insular and less public than
monogamous marriage. It is not protecting a particular form of loving union
but the right to such loving unions that motivates modern jurisprudence.269
Moreover, the existence of a right should not depend on whether the
beneficiaries will enjoy the right publicly or privately.
Some courts have used the nexus between harm and sanction as a
determinative analytical factor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court offered an
example of how Millian theory could be applied. In Commonwealth v.
Bonadio, the court cited On Liberty in striking down a law criminalizing
“deviate” sexual relations:
With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should
properly be exercised to protect each individual’s right to be free
from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not
to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct does not
harm others. “No harm to the secular interests of the community is
265

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
Id. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
267 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006).
268 Id. at 744.
269 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (“For
generations, moral disapproval has been taken as an adequate basis for legislation . . . . But, speaking directly
of same-sex preferences, Lawrence ruled that moral disapproval alone cannot justify legislation discriminating
on this basis.”).
266
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involved in atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult
partners.” Many issues that are considered to be matters of morals are
subject to debate, and no sufficient state interest justifies legislation
of norms simply because a particular belief is followed by a number
of people, or even a majority. Indeed, what is considered to be
“moral” changes with the times and is dependent upon societal
background. Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the
responsibility for striving to improve the morality of individuals.
Enactment of the Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse Statute,
despite the fact that it provides punishment for what many believe to
be abhorrent crimes against nature and perceived sins against God, is
not properly in the realm of the temporal police power.270

Such cases represent a legal trend running opposite to the
compulsive-liberalism scholarship. There is a natural progression toward a
Millian view of harm as protecting individual choice and expression. As the
Court stated in Casey, “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.”271 The distinction drawn by the Court in Casey
should exclude moral harm from the protection of criminal law. It should also
protect acts that the majority may find perverse. As Mill stated, society should
be based on limitations of government to maximize individual freedom:
“liberty of tastes and pursuits . . . of doing as we like; subject to such
consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures,
so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.”272 Harm under Mill is not an elastic
principle allowing expansive government regulation of private conduct but a
principle that protects the foundational belief that “[o]ver himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”273
The Millian view of harm should reinforce a more substantive
interpretation of what constitutes a rational basis for state action under
constitutional law—requiring more tangible and direct statements of harm. In
his stinging dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia objected to the “unheard-of
form of rational-basis review” that underlaid the majority’s decision.274
However, the alternative standard allowed for highly generalized and
conclusory claims of social harm to be made in support of criminal laws—

270
271
272
273
274

415 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1980) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955)).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
MILL, supra note 15, at 28.
Id. at 23.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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allowing judges to impose moral codes with largely instinctive or emotive
rationales. It is certainly true that the Court did not apply the type of
Glucksberg two-step test for a rational basis test.275 However, that test is often
outcome determinative on such questions and is viewed as highly flawed in
asking a court to first define a right and then ask whether the right is “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”276 It is a test that readily
reinforces morality codes and harkens back to Burger’s reliance on authority
reaching back to the very beginnings of the Judeo-Christian values. While the
Court should have been clearer in rejecting this test and in expressly applying
an alternative rational basis test, it was not creating a new test as much as
following a line of cases closer to its analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause case of Romer v. Evans.277 In that case, the Court made the threshold
judgment that the basis for a law did not fall within the realm of legitimate
governmental purposes and was instead “born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected.”278 As noted by Professor Randy E. Barnett, “bare moral
disapproval” was no longer enough.279 That has an obvious Millian appeal to
those who want a closer nexus between harm and state sanctions.
The animus jurisprudence, however, is itself limited from a Millian
perspective since it initially focuses on the motivation of legislators rather than
requiring a consistent showing of concrete harm to justify criminal
sanctions.280 To be sure, it discards the often outcome-determinative
requirement that the state only show how conduct “negat[ed] ‘any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the

275 The first step of the Glucksberg two-step test is determining whether the right is so “fundamental” that
it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21
(1997) (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Lawrence, however, “nowhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual
sodomy is a ‘fundamental right.” 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276 Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
278 Id. at 634; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
279 Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1495 (2008).
280 Obviously, in dealing with the criminalization of plural families, there is ample evidence of such
animus. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit’s recent description of polygamy in Bishop mirrors the earlier discussion in
Brown of the prejudice of the Mormons as “ready-made Other[s].” Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170,
1183 n.15 (D. Utah 2013); see also Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1100 (10th Cir.) (“On the weaker end of
the continuum, a legislative motive may be to simply exclude a particular group from one’s community for no
reason other than an ‘irrational prejudice’ harbored against that group. In this sense, animus may be present
where the lawmaking authority is motivated solely by the urge to call one group ‘other,’ to separate those
persons from the rest of the community (i.e., an ‘us versus them’ legal construct).” (citation omitted)), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).
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classification.’”281 It also relieves courts of having to follow “the various
post-hoc rationalizations that could conceivably have justified the laws.”282
Yet, while animus often underlies criminal morality codes, Mill suggested a
state should have to shoulder this burden, even without a showing of animus,
to limit the liberties of citizens.
In the post-Lawrence world, the Millian notion of harm remains a
contentious matter with some courts. Thus, in Williams v. Morgan, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a statute criminalizing the sale of sex toys after ruling
that “public morality survives as a rational basis for legislation even after
Lawrence.”283 The court insisted that, even though the Court overruled Bowers,
“[t]he principle that ‘[t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality,’
was not announced for the first time in Bowers and remains in force today.”284
The court cited its own ruling that homosexuals could be barred from
adoptions as proof that “public morality likely remains a constitutionally
rational basis for legislation.”285 The voice of Devlin can be heard clearly in
such cases. To yield to the worst of puns, when it comes to post-Lawrence
decisions, the Devlin appears in the details of morality codes.
CONCLUSION
As shown by both the Brown and Bountiful cases, there is general
agreement that, as Chief Justice Bauman stated, these cases are “essentially
about harm.” However, as we have seen, there is little agreement on the
meaning of harm for the purposes of analysis. Ultimately, Chief Justice
Bauman accepted that the social-harm claims without a compelling basis of
empirical data on harm either from polygamy in general or even the more
narrow focus of extreme polygyny groups.286 The implications of such an
approach are obvious. As harm is expanded, government authority over private
281 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
320 (1993)).
282 Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1099.
283 478 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007).
284 Id. (second alteration and omission in original) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986)).
285 Id.
286 The court did rely on the research of Dr. Rose McDermott, who surveyed the literature in the area and
studied the descriptions and findings of the negative impact of polygyny. Bountiful, 2011 BCSC 1588,
para. 581 (Can.). There were also findings based on the work of academics such as the economic analysis of
Dr. Shoshana Grossbard. Id. para. 588. However, these studies do not establish the type of baseline data
discussed above in drawing correlation between plural unions and the abuses or harms detailed in the literature
of the area.
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relations expands commensurately. By defining plural unions as inherently
abusive, families can be prosecuted simply for their status as polygamists
without any specific showing of harm or injury.
Over a century of philosophical debate seems to play out in these cases
regarding the range of legitimate government action over consensual adult
conduct. Indeed, the voices of not just Mill but Devlin and Hart can be heard in
the arguments over the right to criminalize actions that are deemed threatening
to public institutions and social mores. It is a debate that many thought had
been resolved in favor consensual rights and freedom of choice. The irony is
that the greatest shift back toward the position of Devlin has come from a new
liberalism that seeks to punish bad choices expressed in family structures,
speech, or entertainment. While modern advocates may speak more of fighting
patriarchy than defending Christianity, the premise remains the same: the
notion that society can sanction consensual choices deemed degrading or
discriminatory by the majority. With the expansion of the notion of harm
comes the contraction of freedom that Mill most feared:
No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole,
respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government . . . . The
only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others
of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper
guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental and spiritual.
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems
good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to
the rest.287

There is no denying that this approach favors a more libertarian outcome
and certainly runs heavily against what I have referred to as “compulsive
liberalism.” The concept of Millian harm leaves less room for governmental
regulation of consensual relationships and, by extension, less ability to dictate
“good choices” in society. While standards like the rational basis test often rest
on claims of social harm, these standards fail to require a close nexus between
the proscribed conduct and a showing of concrete harm. The requirement of
specific and provable harm would have an obvious impact on the last relics of
morality codes such as criminal fornication and adultery statutes—laws that
are currently on the books in the various states but rarely enforced. Not only
have these laws had no demonstrable impact on conduct, they are considered

287

MILL, supra note 15, at 28–29.
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moribund.288 These laws are already presumptively unconstitutional and would
fail to meet a harm-based test.
A Millian definition of harm favors a bright-line rule that protects core
rights of free exercise as well as free speech and free association. It is not,
however, the invitation to immorality that some have suggested in the public
debate. Rather, it allows for different moral codes to flourish within a
pluralistic society. Indeed, it would be a triumph for morality in the truest
sense since it allows people to pursue their own moral codes and paths rather
than yield to the moral codes of their neighbors. When such majoritarian codes
were routinely enforced in the nineteenth century, they did not create a more
moral society but only the appearance of such a society. It was a coerced or
compelled morality—the very antithesis for principles of free choice and
self-determination. That is why the decisions in Bountiful and Brown were less
about polygamy than they were about privacy.
The “Loadstone Rock” of harm in constitutional analysis holds both the
greatest promise and greatest danger for liberty interests in the United States
and Canada. The rejection of the Millian view in the Bountiful decision and the
adoption of that view in Brown embody that sharp contrast. However, for those
of us who see Millian harm as a key to realizing true freedoms of religion,
speech, and association, cases like Brown hold not just an ideal but also an
inevitable direction for society. The great irony of compulsive liberalism is the
notion of the oppressed rising as the new oppressors. While Devlin’s direct
moral-superiority language is no longer considered appropriate, it has been
replaced with a new moralism citing the abuse of status and dignity of different
groups. There is an underlying belief that criminal law remains an instrument
in achieving correct values and correct decisions. Even with the rise of
compulsive liberalism in scholarship, however, there remains a natural
progression toward individual choice and freedom. In Brown, individual choice
prevailed over those who wanted to use criminal law to protect social
institutions. Despite the longstanding hatred and rage directed at plural
families, the court heard the voices of those who only asked to be left alone to
pursue their own moral course and relations. The Browns did not prevail by
finding counsel or a court who agreed with their choices but rather people who
agreed with their right to make such choices. Despite the calls for greater limits
on speech and consensual conduct, the decision suggests that there may still be
a Millian line that can be drawn to preserve individual freedom and make each
288

See Turley, supra note 3; supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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man and woman the “guardian” of their own values. It is the same optimism
expressed by Sydney Carton in A Tale of Two Cities, even as he was on his
way to the guillotine in the natural progression of liberty:
I see Barsad, and Cly, Defarge, The Vengeance, the Juryman, the
Judge, long ranks of the new oppressors who have risen on the
destruction of the old, perishing by this retributive instrument, before
it shall cease out of its present use. I see a beautiful city and a
brilliant people rising from this abyss, and, in their struggles to be
truly free, in their triumphs and defeats, through long years to come, I
see the evil of this time and of the previous time of which this is the
natural birth, gradually making expiation for itself and wearing
out.289

289

DICKENS, supra note 1, at 360.

